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INTRODUCrION
N Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,' the Supreme
Court stated the obvious-trial judges have a "gatekeeping
role"2 when it comes to scientific evidence. The Court's conclu-
sion-that the Federal Rules of Evidence dispense with the
"general acceptance" standard that previously dominated the
field-is less obvious Still, the "reliability" standard announced in
Daubert was nothing new. Rather, this standard reiterates the law
as it then stood in many jurisdictions.! The striking feature of both
the reliability and the general acceptance standards is that the
court must subject "scientific" evidence to heightened scrutiny.5
This approach creates two broad problems: (1) the "boundary
problem" of identifying the type of evidence that warrants such
careful screening;6 and (2) the "usurpation problem" of keeping the
trial judge from closing the gate on evidence that should be left for
the jury to assess!
Being less revolutionary than one might think from the volumes
that have been written about it, Daubert does little to resolve these
perdurable puzzles and problems. The Supreme Court's more re-
cent opinion in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichaet sidesteps the
boundary problem by making the reliability standard applicable to
all expert testimony and demanding more "rigor" for all expert
1 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2 Id. at 597.
3 See infra Section I.B.3.
4 See infra Section I.B.2.
I "Strict scrutiny" or "heightened scrutiny" are phrases originally developed in the
field of constitutional law to describe the level of judicial review of legislation. Here, I
use the terms to denote an unusually demanding level of review for the admissibility
of scientific evidence as opposed to expert testimony in general.
6 D.H. Kaye, Choice and Boundary Problems in Logerquist, Hummert, and Kumho
Tire, 33 Ariz. St. L.J. 41 (2001).
7 See Logerquist v. McVey, 1 P.3d 113, 131 (Ariz. 2000) (criticizing Daubert and its
extension to technical and other forms of expertise on the ground that "[t]he right to
jury trial does not turn on the judge's preliminary assessment of testimonial reliability.
It is the jury's function to determine accuracy, weight, or credibility."); Edward J.
Imwinkelried, Logerquist v. McVey: The Majority's Flawed Procedural Assumptions,
33 Ariz. St. L.J. 121 (2001) (arguing that Federal Rule of Evidence 104 solves the
problem).
6526 U.S. 137 (1999).
9Exactly what this means is considered infra Section I.C.2.
1934 [Vol. 87:1933
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testimony."0 The emphasis on intellectual rigor, however, has the
potential to exacerbate the usurpation problem." The threat is in-
tensified by the Court's opinion in General Electric Co. v. Joiner,2
which encourages the trial court to exclude testimony when it dis-
agrees with the expert's conclusions as well as the underlying
scientific method. 3
This paper will propose at least partial solutions to the boundary
and usurpation problems, and it will apply them to statistical and
econometric proof. In addition, the paper will review the develop-
ments that have culminated in the modem use of sophisticated
statistical equations and models to prove factual claims such as the
presence of illegal discrimination," racial polarization in voting,"
the identity of criminals, 6 the existence of forgeries, 7 the causes of
"Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152.
See Logerquist, 1 P.3d at 125 ("The result reached in Kumho, however, would
seem directly opposed to the principle of liberalized admissibility that engendered the
abolition of Frye.").
12522 U.S. 136 (1997).
13 See infra Section I.C.2.
11 See, e.g., Statistical Methods in Discrimination Litigation 69-84 (D.H. Kaye &
Mikel Aickin eds., 1986); Richard Lempert, Befuddled Judges: Statistical Evidence in
Title VII Cases, in Legacies of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 263 (Bernard Grofman ed.,
2000).
1. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); Alan D. Taylor, Mathematics
and Politics: Strategy, Voting, Power, and Proof (1995); Bernard Grofman, Expert
Witness Testimony and the Evolution of Voting Rights Case Law, in Controversies in
Minority Voting: The Voting Rights Act in Perspective 197 (Bernard Grofman &
Chandler Davidson eds., 1992); David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference
Guide on Statistics, in Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 83, 141-43 (2d ed.
2000).
16 See, e.g., National Research Council, The Evaluation of Forensic DNA Evidence
(1996) [hereinafter NRC Report] (focusing on population genetics and statistical
issues, with recommendations); D.H. Kaye, Science in Evidence 195-221 (1997); Hans
Zeisel & David Kaye, Prove It with Figures: Empirical Methods in Law and Litigation
199-224 (1997) (discussing DNA profiling in criminal cases); cf. D.H. Kaye, The
Admissibility of "Probability Evidence" in Criminal Trials (pts. 1 & 2), 26 Jurimetrics
J. 343 (1986), 27 Jurimetrics J. 160 (1987) (discussing other, often less sophisticated
uses of probability theory to link a defendant to a crime); D.H. Kaye, Statistics for
Lawyers and Law for Statistics, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1520, 1525-44 (1991) (discussing an
attempt to show mathematically that the defendant could not have traveled from
work to home and murdered his wife in the time period allowed by the state's
evidence).
17 See, e.g., Paul Meier & Sandy Zabell, Benjamin Peirce and the Howland Will, 75
J. Am. Stat. Ass'n 497 (1980); The Howland Will Case, 4 Am. L. Rev. 625 (1870).
2001] 1935
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trends in sales or prices,"8 and the quantum of damages caused by
illegal conduct. 9
Part I will show that, before Daubert, the admissibility of com-
plex statistical evidence usually was taken for granted. Arguments
centered on the weight to be accorded to this evidence in particular
cases. Today, pretrial motions challenging the admissibility of sta-
tistical studies have become commonplace. Federal courts are now
faced with the task of fitting this type of expertise into the frame-
work for determining admissibility constructed in the Daubert-
Joiner-Kumho trilogy and codified in the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence.' Part I will also analyze the admissibility issue under other
standards for screening scientific evidence. Some states that use a
scientific validity standard A la Daubert might not follow Kumho.
These jurisdictions will have to determine whether statistics and
economics are subject to any form of heightened scrutiny. Some
states might resist Joiner's blurring of the distinction between
methodology and conclusion. These jurisdictions will have to de-
cide what aspects of statistical testimony constitute the
methodology that must be scientifically valid. Finally, states that
adhere to the standard of general scientific acceptance face compa-
18 See, e.g., Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Peter 0. Steiner, Quantitative Methods in
Antitrust Litigation, 46 Law & Contemp. Probs. 69 (1983).
19 See, e.g., Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 1226, 1240-41 (8th Cir.
1982); Litigation Economics (Patrick A. Gaughan & Robert J. Thornton eds., 1993);
R.S. Daggett & D.A. Freedman, Econometrics and the Law: A Case Study in the
Proof of Antitrust Damages, in 1 Proceedings of the Berekeley Conference in Honor
of Jerzey Neyman 123 (Lucien M. Le Cam & Richard A. Olshen eds., 1985); Michael
0. Finkelstein & Hans Levenbach, Regression Estimates of Damages in Price-Fixing
Cases, 46 Law & Contemp. Probs. 145 (1983), reprinted in Statistics and the Law 79
(Morris H. DeGroot et al. eds., 1986); Scott L. Zeger et al., Statistical Testimony on
Damages in Minnesota v. Tobacco Industry, in Statistical Science in the Courtroom
303 (Joseph L. Gastwirth ed., 2000).
For general discussions of statistics in litigation or collections of papers on the topic,
see, for example, The Evolving Role of Statistical Assessments as Evidence in the
Courts (Stephen E. Fienberg ed., 1989) [hereinafter Statistical Assessments as
Evidence]; Statistical Science in the Courtroom (Joseph L. Gastwirth ed., 2000);
Statistics and the Law, supra. Expositions of statistical theory tailored to legal
applications include Michael 0. Finkelstein & Bruce Levin, Statistics for Lawyers (2d
ed. 2001); 1 Joseph L. Gastwirth, Statistical Reasoning in Law and Public Policy
(1988); Zeisel & Kaye, supra note 16, at 45-68; Kaye & Freedman, supra note 15;
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Reference Guide on Multiple Regression, in Reference Manual
on Scientific Evidence, supra note 15, at 179.
Fed. R. Evid. 702 (2000).
[Vol. 87:19331936
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rable challenges in defining the subject matter of statistics and eco-
nomics and the scope of this test for the admissibility of scientific
evidence.
After analyzing the leading cases on scientific evidence and dis-
cussing their effects on efforts to introduce statistical proof, this
paper will consider these emerging issues in the context of an anti-
trust case in which an econometric analysis was introduced to show
both causation and damages. By describing the arguments on a
pending appeal, Part II will illustrate the difficulty of distinguishing
between statistical methodology and conclusion, but will conclude
that the distinction is viable and valuable. The discussion will also
reveal the extent to which the dictum in Kumho concerning the
need for rigor encourages arguments as to admissibility that, in an
earlier era, would have been treated as affecting only the weight of
expert evidence. Finally, the case shows how difficult it can be to
explain to judges and juries serious methodological defects in sta-
tistical assessments.
The paper will conclude that Daubert-like screening of complex
statistical analyses is a salutary development, but that the task re-
quires the elaboration of standards that attend to the distinction
between a general methodology and a specific conclusion. Screen-
ing statistical proof demands some sophistication in evaluating the
choice of a research design or statistical model, the variables in-
cluded in a particular model, the procedures taken to verify the
usefulness of the model for the data at hand, and the inferences or
estimates that follow from the statistical analysis. The factors enu-
merated in Daubert work reasonably well with some of these
aspects of the expert's work, but these factors are less well adapted
to other aspects. If the "intellectual rigor" standard of Kumho is
used to fill the gap, it must be applied with some caution lest it be-
come a subterfuge for excluding expert testimony that is less than
ideal but still within the range of reasonable scientific debate.
I. STANDARDS FOR ADMITTING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
Statistics are part of science, and science is one type of expertise.
To appreciate how the law of evidence pertains to statistical proof,
we must consider the rules of evidence as they apply to experts in
general and to scientific testimony in particular. With that neces-
sary prolegomenon, we will be in a position to determine how
2001] 1937
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these approaches to regulating scientific and expert testimony have
been and should be applied to statistical and econometric proof.
A. The Classical Period: Relevant Expertise
For centuries, the law did not distinguish one type of expert tes-
timony from another.21 On the surface, a uniform standard
governed the admission of the testimony of all qualified experts.'
The evidence had to be relevant and not too prejudicial or time-
consuming, and it had to deal with matters not comprehensible to
ordinary jurors without the assistance of an expert. A few jurisdic-
tions continue in this tradition,' although the beyond-the-ken-of-
21 See, e.g., 3 Simon Greenleaf, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence § 440, at 483
(1858) (describing the admissibility of opinion testimony from all "persons of skill,
sometimes called experts," on "questions of science, skill, or trade, or others of the
like kind"). Before the sixteenth century, experts usually were part of the jury. Once
experts became witnesses, it is not clear whether they were called by the parties or the
court. John Basten, The Court Expert in Civil Trials-A Comparative Appraisal, 40
Mod. L. Rev. 174, 175-76 (1977). The first clear reference to an expert witness called
by and on behalf of a party appears in Folkes v. Chadd, 99 Eng. Rep. 589, 589-90
(1782). Basten, supra, at 176.
2For early discussions of expert testimony, see Lee M. Friedman, Expert
Testimony, Its Abuses and Reformation, 19 Yale L.J. 247 (1910) (proposing stronger
guarantees against the admission of interested or unqualified expert testimony);
Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony,
15 Harv. L. Rev. 40 (1901) (discussing the development of the use of expert
witnesses); Clemens Herschel, Services of Experts in the Conduct of Judicial
Inquiries, 21 Am. L. Rev. 571 (1887).
E.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. Mahlum, 970 P.2d 98, 108 n.3 (Nev. 1998) (declining to
adopt Daubert even though it is persuasive because of a belief that the doctrine is a
"work in progress"); State v. Council, 515 S.E.2d 508, 517-18 (S.C. 1999); State v.
Peters, 534 N.W.2d 867, 872-73 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) ("Unlike judges in Frye and
Daubert jurisdictions, this role is much more oblique and does not involve a direct
determination as to the reliability of the scientific principle on which the evidence is
based.").
An issue often ignored under the classical relevancy-expertise standard is whether
the putative expertise exists. Emphasizing that most experts were drawn from
professions or occupations in which they had achieved "a modicum of prosperity,"
however, several commentators have maintained that an implicit "commercial
marketplace test" was the usual means of demonstrating the existence of a body of
expert knowledge or skill. 1 Modem Scientific Evidence: The Law and Science of
Expert Testimony § 1-2.1, at 3 & n.5 (David L. Faigman et al. eds., 1997) [hereinafter
Modem Scientific Evidence]. Indeed, this treatise suggests that the commercial
marketplace was the sole source for recognized expertise. Id. at 3-4 (drawing on
David L. Faigman et al., Check Your Crystal Ball at the Courthouse Door, Please:
Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and Worrying about the Future of
[Vol. 87:19331938
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the-jury standard24 usually has been softened to require only that
the expert's knowledge be helpful to the jury.'
Although the relevance-expertise requirement applies to scien-
tific and nonscientific expertise alike, it need not have the same
impact on all types of expert testimony. Scientific evidence tends to
be time-consuming and difficult to understand. 6 Courts fear that it
comes cloaked in an aura of infallibility and that this leads jurors to
give it more credence than it deserves.' Consequently, ad hoe bal-
Scientific Evidence, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 1799 (1994)). The authorities cited for this
strong claim, however, are inconclusive. See id., §1-2.1, at 4 n.7. Furthermore, there
are indications that courts were quite willing to recognize expertise acquired outside
the commercial marketplace. See, e.g., 3 Greenleaf, supra note 21, at 485 (referring to
"[a] person acquainted for many years with a certain stream, its rapidity of rise in
times of freshet, and the volume and force of its waters" as entitled to give an expert
opinion in "the sufficiency of a dam, erected in that place, to resist the force of the
flood").
24 E.g., State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 379 (N.J. 1984) ("[T]he intended testimony must
concern a subject matter that is beyond the ken of the average juror."); 3 Greenleaf,
supra note 21, § 440a, at 487 ("The testimony of experts is not admissible upon
matters of judgment within the knowledge and experience of ordinary jurymen .... -);
Charles T. McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 13, at 28 (1954) ("[Tlhe
subject ... must be ... beyond the ken of the average layman.").
2- See, e.g., 1 McCormick on Evidence § 13, at 58-59 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed.
1999).
2 See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1119 (7th Cir. 1999) (Easterbrook,
J., concurring) ("Social science evidence is difficult to absorb; the idea of hypothesis
formulation and testing is alien to most persons. That's one reason why the training of
social scientists is so extended.").
27 See, e.g., United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741,744 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (stating that
scientific evidence may "assume a posture of mythic infallibility in the eyes of a jury
of laymen"); United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973) (noting the
potential prejudicial effect arising from the "aura of special reliability and
trustworthiness" of scientific testimony); Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C.
Kirkpatrick, Modem Evidence: Doctrine and Practice § 7.8, at 992 (1995) (citing cases
involving efforts to procure funds for expert testimony on eyewitness identification
for the proposition that "[s]cientific proof may suggest unwarranted certainty to lay
factfinders, especially if it comes dressed up in technical jargon, complicated
mathematical or statistical analysis, or involves a magic machine ('black box') that
may seem to promise more than it delivers"); John William Strong, Language and
Logic in Expert Testimony: Limiting Expert Testimony by Restrictions of Function,
Reliability, and Form, 71 Or. L. Rev. 349,367 n.81 (1992) ("There is virtual unanimity
among courts and commentators that evidence perceived by jurors to be 'scientific' in
nature will have particularly persuasive effect."). Some commentators, skeptical of
the claims of mainstream science and medicine that these disciplines know the truth,
have more faith in the power of juries to evaluate contested scientific evidence. See,
e.g., Michael S. Jacobs, Testing the Assumptions Underlying the Debate About
Scientific Evidence: A Closer Look at Juror "Incompetence" and Scientific
"Objectivity," 25 Conn. L. Rev. 1083 (1993).
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ancing of probative value and its counterweights can operate to ex-
clude scientific evidence, especially if the science is not well-
established.'
Perhaps the earliest reported instance of a statistical assessment
admitted under this classical approach is Robinson v. Mandell.' On
July 2, 1865, Sylvia Ann Howland died. An 1863 will left half the
estate, worth more than two million dollars, to a number of indi-
viduals and institutions and provided that half was to be held in
trust for Sylvia's niece, Hetty Robinson. Although Hetty had re-
cently inherited more than one million dollars from her father, she
sought her aunt's entire estate under an 1862 will that named her
as the sole heir and that provided that no later will should be hon-
ored. The executor, Thomas Mandell, claimed that two of the three
signatures on the earlier will were traced from an 1864 codicil to
the 1863 will, and that even if the earlier will were genuine, the
later one applied.'
Both Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr., Parkman Professor in the
Harvard Medical School, and Louis Agassiz, another Harvard pro-
fessor and one of the world's leading naturalists, examined the
contested signatures under a microscope and testified for Robinson
that they saw no evidence of tracing." Mandell countered with tes-
timony from Benjamin Peirce, Professor of Mathematics at
Harvard, and his son, Charles Sanders Peirce.' The Peirces pur-
ported to demonstrate that the signatures were forgeries by
contrasting the similarities between one of the disputed signatures
and its counterpart in the 1864 codicil with the less extensive simi-
Peters, 534 N.W.2d at 873 ("[A]Ithough Wisconsin judges do not evaluate the
reliability of scientific evidence, they may restrict the admissibility of such evidence
through their limited gatekeeping functions.").
29 20 F. Cas. 1027 (C.C.D. Mass. 1868) (No. 11,959). The description of the case that
follows is taken largely from Meier & Zabell, supra note 17. For a more detailed and
comprehensive account of the litigation, see The Howland Will Case, supra note 17.
30 Meier & Zabell, supra note 17, at 497; The Howland Will Case, supra note 17, at
631-33,639.
31The Howland Will Case, supra note 17, at 652-53. According to Statistical
Assessments as Evidence, supra note 19, at 214, Dr. Holmes was "destroyed on cross-
examination and forced to admit that he had only first examined the will the previous
day."
32 The Peirces were among the first to contribute to the development of
mathematical statistics in the United States, and the younger Peirce later became
prominent for his work in philosophy. Meier & Zabell, supra note 17, at 497.
[Vol. 87:19331940
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larities between the disputed signature and forty-two others on
documents written by Sylvia Ann Howland in her later years. C.S.
Peirce examined every possible pair of signatures to see how many
of the downstrokes in the words "Sylvia Ann Howland" coincided
in position and length.3 He found agreement in approximately one
in every five downstrokes. Professor Peirce then testified to an "ex-
traordinary" coincidence in the positions of the thirty downstrokes
in the disputed signature and the 1864 signature. He described
complete "[c]oincidence of position" as "infallible evidence of de-
sign."' Being a professor of mathematics, Peirce was not content to
rest on intuition alone. He insisted that "[t]he mathematical discus-
sion of this subject has never, to my knowledge, been proposed,
but it is not difficult; and a numerical expression applicable to this
problem, the correctness of which would be instantly recognized by
all the mathematicians of the world, can be readily obtained."35 He
reasoned that the probability of thirty matches in a given pair of
authentic signatures was (1/5)30, or "once in 2,666 millions of mil-
lions of millions."' "This number," he added, "far transcends
human experience."' Decided in a century in which scientific and
statistical studies received no more scrutiny than any other expert
testimony, the admissibility of these calculations was not chal-
lenged,' and even the cross-examination of Peirce was largely
ineffectual.
'- There are 861 distinct pairs that can be formed from 42 items. Checking 30
downstrokes per item entails 25,830 comparisons. Id. at 499.
Id. (quoting Peirce's testimony).
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id. This figure is slightly understated, since 5' = 9.31 x 10 .
" He continued: "So vast an improbability is practically an impossibility. Such
evanescent shadows of probability cannot belong to actual life. They are
unimaginably less than those least things which the law cares not for." Id. (quoting
Peirce's testimony).
" From the modern perspective, however, several features of his mathematical
analysis are questionable, including the implicit assumption of independence in the
matches for the downstrokes. Id. at 501. One might expect that agreement in, for
example, positions one and three, would make far more likely an agreement in
position two. The effect of such dependence would be to increase the probability of
thirty matches over that quoted, quite possibly by orders of magnitude. Id. Despite
such criticisms, Meier and Zabell conclude that "against the background of his era,
Peirce's analysis must be judged unusually clear and complete." Id. at 503.
-' Peirce's demeanor and reputation as a mathematician must have been
intimidating, for there was no mathematical rebuttal. On cross-examination, he
19412001]
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In 1915, however, the New York Court of Appeals held in Peo-
ple v. Risley' that even under the relevance-expertise regime,
another mathematician's testimony about an alleged forgery was
inadmissible in a criminal case. An attorney was charged with fraud
in the course of representing a corporate client in a civil matter.
Apparently, he had removed a document that had been placed in
evidence and typed in the words "the same" to make the meaning
more favorable to his client.1 An expert on typewriters testified
that as typed on the document, the six distinct letters in the words
"the same" exhibited eleven specific peculiarities. 2 For example,
the "t" was not strictly vertical, but slanted; other letters were miss-
ing serifs, and so on. This expert reported that a typewriter
removed from Risley's office produced characters with the same
peculiarities. A second expert, described by the New York Court
of Appeals as "a professor of mathematics in one of the universi-
ties of the state," testified that "by the application of the law of
mathematical probabilities, the chance of such defects being pro-
duced by another typewriting machine was so small as to be
practically a negative quantity.
' ''3
confessed a lack of special expertise in judging handwriting, but counsel did not cross-
examine on the numerical and mathematical parts of the testimony. Nevertheless, the
probability computation was not dispositive. The court held that even if the earlier
will were Howland's, there was insufficient evidence of the consideration necessary to
make binding the instruction to dishonor later wills. The court made no finding on the
forgery claim. Robinson, 20 F. Cas. at 1032.
108 N.E. 200 (N.Y. 1915).
41 Id. at 202.
4 Id.
4 Id. As the court described the testimony:
The witness asserted that, when the facts are ascertained, the application of the
law of probabilities to them is a matter of pure mathematics and not of
speculation or opinion. He defined the law of probabilities as "a proper fraction
expressing the ratio of the number of ways an event may happen, divided by the
total number of ways in which it can happen." The various defects claimed to be
visible and pointed out by the experts in the specimens of typewriting made
upon the defendant's machine.., were called to the witness' attention by the
district attorney, and he was asked to apply the law of mathematical probability
thereto. For illustration he was asked: "If it be assumed that it is as probable
that any given letter will slant as it is it will not slant, are you able to ascertain
what is the probability that the letter 't' in the six letters, 't, h, e, s, a, m,' will
slant and the others remain perpendicular?" He answered: "One in 64."
Practically the same form of question was put to him in regard to missing serifs
on other letters and embracing various features pointed out by the experts, and
by a process of compounding these results concerning each of the particular
1942
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Over a dissent, the New York Court of Appeals reversed this
conviction. The majority questioned the assumption that merely
because a letter could slant or not slant, the probability that it
would slant is one-half. Observing that the mathematician had no
particular knowledge about the frequency of observable defects in
typewriters, the court dismissed his statement of the probability
because it "was not based upon actual observed data, but was sim-
ply speculative."" In Robinson, Peirce had arrived at one-fifth for
the probability of two matching strokes by a study of genuine sig-
natures." In Risley, the mathematician had no such empirical
foundation for using a value of one-half. Accordingly, the statistical
evidence in Risley was inadmissible under general principles of
relevancy.46 As we shall see, even when the doctrinal basis for
evaluating scientific testimony became more rigorous, the courts
continued to apply the classical relevance-expertise standards to
statistical evidence.
B. The Modern Period: Heightened Scrutiny for Scientific Evidence
When a major category of evidence is thought to be unusually
prejudicial, ad hoc balancing often crystallizes into more special-
defects the witness was permitted to give his conclusion that the probability of
these defects being reproduced by the work of a typewriting machine, other
than the machine of defendant, was one in four thousand million, which was, of
course, equivalent to a statement that it could never occur.
Id.
44 Id. at 203. Of course, the assumption that each peculiarity in the typed characters
had a probability of one-half is not the only objectionable feature of the mathematical
proof in Risley. The "process of compounding" the probabilities pertaining to each
letter deserves scrutiny. This is an application of the rule that if two events A and B
are probabilistically independent, then their joint probability is the product of their
individual probabilities: Pr(AB) = Pr(A) x Pr(B). The mathematician in Risley arrived
at the 1/64 and 1/4,000,000,000 figures by assuming such independence with respect to
each characteristic among the six letters of the typewriter keyboard. As a concurring
opinion pointed out, however,
the likelihood of similar defects... would depend on the dies from which [the
type] were made, on the process of manufacture, on the greater likelihood of
particular parts, such as serifs, being broken by use, on the material composing
the type, on the way in which the machine had been used, and doubtless on
many other things.
Id. at 204 (Miller, J., concurring).
4- See Meier & Zabell, supra note 17, at 499.
",1 McCormick on Evidence, supra note 25, § 210, at 808 & n.12.
2001] 1943
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ized rules." For example, evidence of bad character is generally not
admissible merely to show a tendency to act wrongly.' Evidence of
insurance is not admissible to suggest that the insured might be-
have carelessly.49 In principle, there may be no difference between
the pattern of decisions under an ad hoc balancing of probative
value and prejudicial effect, but in practice, the presence of a spe-
cialized rule reinforces the recognition that the evidence poses
special problems. To this extent, it ensures that the evidence re-
ceives heightened scrutiny, and it explains the factors that go into
this scrutiny. Furthermore, if the rule is not too amorphous, it
channels discretion, producing a more uniform and predictable pat-
tern of decisions. If all judges and counsel were perfect and could
effortlessly discern the proper outcome of ad hoc balancing, then
case-by-case balancing would be ideal. The reality is that unstruc-
tured, ad hoc balancing is difficult to do well, and it may be that a
cruder but more easily applied rule will produce more consistent
outcomes with less effort and little loss in accuracy across all
cases.' This is a major argument for categorical rules as opposed to
vague standards in many areas of law. 1
Given the pressures for specialized rules of relevance and the
perception that scientific evidence poses special problems, it is
hardly surprising that courts would come to supplement the rele-
vance-expertise standard with more specific rules that attend to the
special features of scientific evidence.5 2 Two forms of additional
4 See. id. § 185, at 648 ("In certain areas, such as proof of character, comparable
situations recur so often that relatively particularized rules channel the exercise of
discretion.").
48 Id. § 186, at 649.
41 Id. § 201, at 711.
10Cf. Richard A. Epstein, The Risks of Risk/Utility, 48 Ohio St. L.J. 469 (1987)
(defending older common law tort rules over ad hoc balancing of risk and utility);
Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 557
(1992) (offering an economic analysis for whether legal commands should be made as
standards or rules); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules
vs. Standards Revisited, 79 Or. L. Rev. 23 (2000) (discussing the relative merits of
rules and standards).
51 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106
Harv. L. Rev. 22 (1992).
12 In Faigman et al., supra note 23, Professor David L. Faigman and his colleagues
offer another explanation for the introduction of the general acceptance standard,
which was the first specialized rule for scientific evidence. Although they recognize
that relevance and helpfulness played a role in admitting expert evidence, they locate
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scrutiny-general acceptance and scientific soundness-are domi-
nant.
1. General Acceptance: Frye
The general acceptance standard made its debut in the now
celebrated case of Frye v. United States.'3 Alphonse Frye, a young
black man in the District of Columbia, was charged with murder.
He sought to introduce the testimony of a psychologist, William
Moulton Marston, who had administered a systolic blood pressure
test to Frye. According to Dr. Marston, the test revealed that Frye
was truthful when he denied committing the murder.' Dr. Marston
had developed this forerunner of the polygraph test for truthful-
ness, but it is not clear what he had done to establish its validity.5
This testimony could have been excluded under the traditional
relevance-expertise standard. Dr. Marston, who was a professor of
psychology at Harvard College,'M was, of course, qualified to give
certain kinds of expert testimony. If his opinion about Frye's verac-
ity was based on a procedure that was not well studied, however, it
could have been rejected as too speculative to be of much assis-
the general acceptance standard in the requirement that an expert be qualified. They
suggest that the qualifications of the expert were determinative of admissibility: "If
the witness was an expert, then his or her opinion testimony was 'entitled' to be
admitted as evidence (given, of course, its apparent relevance to the issues to be
determined at trial)." Id. at 1803. Qualifications, in their view, turned on a
"commercial marketplace" test: "If a person could make a living selling his knowledge
in the marketplace, then presumably expertise existed." Id. at 1804. Because there
was no commercial market for forensic science, however, courts were forced to
modify the test, and they chose to substitute "[t]he intellectual or professional
marketplace" as "a proxy for the commercial marketplace." Id. at 1806.
This reconstruction fails to account for expertise that is neither commercial,
intellectual, nor scientific. A witness whose expertise was developed as a hobby and
for which no commercial market exists would be qualified to give expert testimony,
but the admissibility of the proposed testimony would not turn on whether the
expert's conclusions were based on methods generally accepted in the field. See supra
note 23.
- 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
5 Id.
"- But see William M. Marston, Systolic Blood Pressure Symptoms of Deception, 2
J. Experimental Psychol. 117 (1917) (reporting the results of research on the effects of
a consciousness of deception on systolic blood pressure).
Marston developed the theory of a "specific lie response" while he was a Harvard
law student. Years later, he created the comic strip heroine, Wonder Woman, whose
golden lasso induced anyone within its circumference to speak the truth. 2 Who Was
Who in America 347 (1950).
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tance to the jury. Indeed, the trial judge, in excluding the testi-
mony, may have been following just this approach.
In affirming the trial court's ruling, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia observed that "[fJust when a
scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the ex-
perimental and the demonstrable stages is difficult to determine.""
This observation is entirely consistent with the traditional ap-
proach. A conclusion drawn from a technique that still is
"experimental" rather than "demonstrable" may be relevant, but it
also may be too insecure to be sufficiently helpful to the jury.
The innovation of Frye lies in how the court of appeals ascer-
tained whether the technique was too speculative. The court was
not content to rely solely on the assertion of the well-qualified ex-
pert who had experimented with systolic blood pressure as an
indicator of truthfulness; neither was it prepared to inquire directly
into whether his work was sufficient to establish the validity of the
technique. Rather, it affirmed the exclusion of the evidence on the
neoteric ground that other psychologists had yet to accept Mar-
ston's claim that he could verify honesty by measuring the
speaker's blood pressure. Although no previous cases explicitly
had held this general acceptance to be indispensable, the court
boldly wrote:
Somewhere in this twilight zone [between the experimental and
the demonstrable] the evidential force of the principle must be
recognized, and while the courts will go a long way in admitting
expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific
principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is
made must be sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.m
The requirement of general acceptance, like any special trust-
worthiness test, tends to screen out evidence. The Frye court
offered no reason for imposing this special requirement, but subse-
quent courts and commentators have filled the gap. As noted
above, the rule can be understood as a crystallization of the ad hoc
balancing that trial courts are expected to undertake. Ideally, this
rule screens out evidence that is superficially impressive but not
57Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
58 Id.
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sufficiently probative because it is not scientifically valid. The rule
does not ask-or even permit-the court to ascertain scientific va-
lidity for itself. Instead, the court must defer to the scientific
community, for the rule treats "general acceptance" as a surrogate
for validity. By looking to the views of the scientific community,
the rule avoids having the judge act like an independent scientist.
Of course, demanding general acceptance as opposed to some
lesser degree of support among scientists tends to increase the in-
cidence of "false negatives" (rulings that exclude valid scientific
evidence) over "false positives" (rulings that admit invalid scien-
tific evidence). This conservative strategy59 has been defended as an
appropriate response to the risk that jurors are too credulous of
scientific evidence.' 0 Furthermore, waiting until a technique has
been generally accepted ensures that it has been widely studied
and thus assures that a pool of experts is available to both sides to
verify that the technique has been applied properly.
In practice, the objectives of a clear rule-uniformity and pre-
dictability-have not been achieved. Courts in different Frye
jurisdictions have reached contradictory results with respect to the
same types of scientific evidence,6' and it is not obvious that the
uniformity achieved under Frye is any greater than that which
would be obtained with most other plausible rules or standards.
Ambiguities as to the propositions that must be generally accepted,
the fields in which they must be accepted, the extent to which they
must be accepted, and the indicia and proof needed to show their
acceptance have made Frye disappointingly ductile and frustrat-
ingly unpredictable.62
19 Fredric I. Lederer, Resolving the Frye Dilemma-A Reliability Approach, 26
Jurimetrics J. 240, 241 (1986) ("Frye tends to be unduly conservative in its effect on
the admissibility of novel evidence.").
60 See, e.g., Steven M. Egesdal, Note, The Frye Doctrine and Relevancy Approach
Controversy: An Empirical Evaluation, 74 Geo. L.J. 1769,1772,1774 n.26 (1986).
6, See, e.g., Bert Black et al., Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert- A New
Search for Scientific Knowledge, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 715, 737-39 (1994) (referring to
diverging opinions by courts on voiceprint evidence); Paul C. Giannelli, The
Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century
Later, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1197, 1219-21 (1980) (discussing selective application of
Frye or similar evidentiary demands).
6See, e.g., 1 McCormick on Evidence, supra note 25, § 203, at 727-31; Don E.
Walden, Note, United States v. Downing- Novel Scientific Evidence and the Rejection
of Frye, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 839, 840-41.
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Thus, the use of Frye in evaluating statistical assessments has
been capricious. Traditionally, Frye simply was not perceived as a
barrier to statistical testimony.' Starting in the 1970s, parties in
employment discrimination cases brought under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 began to make extensive use of statistical
expertise.' Early cases involved simple comparisons of propor-
tions,65 but as "[t]he [f]loodgates... [o]pened,"' more complicated
studies were introduced.67 Courts discussed standard deviations,
correlation coefficients,6 9 significance levels,70 hypothesis tests,71
Mantel-Haenzel tests,' scattergrams7 3 nonlinear regressions,7 and
6See, e.g., Statistical Assessments as Evidence, supra note 19, at 220 (citing
Symposium on Science and the Rules of Evidence, 99 F.R.D. 188 (William A. Thomas
ed., 1983), for the view that "the Frye doctrine... will almost never limit a statistical
expert even if his or her particular statistical theories or methods of analysis are not
generally accepted").
AId. at 102-03.
E.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 235-36 (1976) (discussing the disparate
impact of a civil service test on African-Americans seeking jobs as police officers);
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (discussing the disparate
impact on African-Americans of a high school diploma requirement and employment
tests).
1 Statistical Assessments as Evidence, supra note 19, at 93.
67 Id. at 94-102 (describing cases and arguments regarding multiple and logistical
regressions). Statistical studies played an important part in Title VII litigation (and in
paving the way for the use of statistical expertise in other types of litigation) for a
variety of reasons. See id. at 102.
E.g., EEOC v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d 633, 651 (4th Cir. 1983) ("If our
computation is correct, the standard deviation for pay grade 5 was -1.87 .. ").
69 E.g., Bernard v. Gulf Oil Corp., 890 F.2d 735,742 (5th Cir. 1989) ("Plaintiffs urge
that a correlation coefficient in the .30-.40 range be established as the minimum for
proof of a job related test. We decline to establish a bright line cut-off point for the
establishment of job-relatedness in testing.").70 E.g., Fed. Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d at 647 (recognizing that the 0.05 level is
arbitrary).
71 E.g., Moultrie v. Martin, 690 F.2d 1078, 1082 (4th Cir. 1982) ("[S]tatisticians
compare figures through an objective process known as hypothesis testing.").
E.g., Hogan v. Pierce, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 115 (D.D.C. 1983).
73 E.g., Cherry v. Amoco Oil Co., 490 F. Supp. 1026, 1028-29, 1030 (D. Ga. 1980)
(finding that a sociologist's scattergram of "credit application acceptance rate" and
the proportions of nonwhites residing in zip code regions merely demonstrated that
"the computerized grading system [for issuing gasoline credit cards] taken as a whole
tends to reject a disproportionate number of persons living in predominantly black
areas").
74 E.g., Craik v. Minn. State Univ. Bd., 731 F.2d 465, 476 n.13 (8th Cir. 1984) (noting
that logistic regression should have been used, but relying on ordinary least squares
regression because neither party explained the difference in the methods).
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reverse regressions.75 These cases concerned issues such as whether
a study that fails to show a disparity that is significant at the 0.05
level could create a prima facie case of disparate impact,76 or
whether a study that does show a significant difference in salaries
but omits certain variables "must be considered unacceptable as
evidence of discrimination. ' The opinions and arguments in these
cases, however, almost never questioned the admissibility of the
evidence. They never suggested that the general acceptance stan-
dard or a heightened reliability standard might make the expert's
testimony inadmissible.78
Likewise, epidemiological studies in civil cases were admitted
with little scrutiny for many years.79 In parentage proceedings,
courts initially questioned the general acceptance of serological
methods,' and they would not admit blood group typing to estab-
lish paternity.8' As the number and power of genetic tests that
7E.g., Penk v. Or. State Bd. of Higher Educ., 36 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 35,049
(D. Or. 1985), aff'd, 816 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1987).
76 See Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249,1282-83 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
Bazemore v. Friday, 751 F.2d 662,672 (4th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 478 U.S. 385 (1986).
'9Bazemore is a rare case in which the Supreme Court spoke in terms of
admissibility of a study said to omit important variables. But the Court did not ask
whether the regression conformed to standard statistical practice. Instead, it
remarked that a "plaintiff in a Title VII suit need not prove discrimination with
scientific certainty," id., 478 U.S. at 400, and it alluded to the broad principles of
relevancy codified in Federal Rules 401 and 403, explaining that "[n]ormally, failure
to include variables will affect the analysis' probativeness, not its admissibility." Id.
An accompanying footnote indicates that to be inadmissible for lack of probative
value, a regression would have to be grossly inadequate. Id. at 400 n.10 ("There may,
of course, be some regressions so incomplete as to be inadmissible as irrelevant; but
such was clearly not the case here.").
79 See David E. Bernstein, Frye, Frye, Again: The Past, Present, and Future of the
General Acceptance Test, 41 Jurimetrics J. 385, 390 (2001) (noting that until 1988 no
court applied Frye to a toxic tort case).
See, e.g., Huntingdon v. Crowley, 414 P.2d 382, 390 (Cal. 1966) (holding that lack
of general acceptance justified exclusion); State v. Damm, 252 N.W. 7, 12 (S.D. 1933)
(holding that the lack of medical and scientific agreement justified exclusion).
"1 The test results were admissible to exclude a man as the father, but not to include
him as a biologically possible candidate. See Moore v. McNamara, 513 A.2d 660, 666
(Conn. 1986) ("The use of blood test results had necessarily been restricted in this
way because at one time only a few antigens.., were known."); Flippen v. Meinhold,
282 N.Y.S. 444, 446 (N.Y. City Ct. 1935) (reporting that "[no case has been found in
which blood grouping tests have been deemed admissible for the purpose of
establishing paternity" and declining to order blood tests for this purpose). This
asymmetrical common law rule rested on the disparity in the probative value of the
two types of findings. An exclusion was essentially conclusive; but with the limited
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could be applied to determine parentage grew, however, the tradi-
tional rule began to crumble under the weight of cases' and
specialized statutes.' Laboratories usually accompanied their in-
clusionary findings with an impressive "probability of paternity"-
a statistic that largely went unchallenged. Eventually, some courts
restricted the practice,8' but the doctrinal basis was not general ac-
ceptance. Rather, it was the normal weighing of probative value
and prejudicial effect. 5
Similarly, "[n]ot so long ago, the courts refused to admit either
survey or sampling evidence." ' Public opinion was not established
number of genetic systems then available, an inclusion was not especially revealing.
See Commonwealth v. English, 186 A. 298, 300 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1936) (explaining that
"in 14 3/4 per cent. of the cases examined the blood grouping test can exonerate, but
in no case does it incriminate"); Flippen, 282 N.Y.S. at 446. In Flippen, the court
wrote:
If the test shows a negative result, it would seem to be conclusive proof of
nonpaternity, but the positive would simply indicate the possibility of paternity.
It would be improper to draw an inference of paternity where merely the
possibility is shown; where different inferences may be drawn from a proven
fact, no judicial determination may be based thereon.
Id.
82 Ira Mark Ellman & David Kaye, Probabilities and Proof: Can HLA and Blood
Group Testing Prove Paternity?, 54 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1131,1131-32 & n.7 (1979).
8 D.H. Kaye & Ronald Kanwischer, Admissibility of Genetic Testing in Paternity
Litigation: A Survey of State Statutes, 22 Fam. L.Q. 109 (1988).
4See, e.g., Plemel v. Walter, 735 P.2d 1209, 1219 (Or. 1987) (imposing three
conditions on an expert's testimony regarding the probablity of paternity) (discussed
in D.H. Kaye, Plemel as a Primer on Proving Paternity, 24 Willamette L. Rev. 867
(1988)); D.H. Kaye, The Probability of an Ultimate Issue: The Strange Cases of
Paternity Testing, 75 Iowa L. Rev. 75, 77-78 (1989) (discussing limitations on the
presentation of the "probability of paternity" adopted by various state supreme
courts).
85 See, e.g., Plemel, 735 P.2d at 1218-19; Ellman & Kaye, supra note 82, at 1149-50
(discussing the application of Bayes' Theorem). The paternity probability normally is
computed according to Bayes' Theorem using a prior probability of one-half. The
effort to divorce the paternity probability from the nongenetic evidence in the case
poses complications in presenting the genetic evidence fairly. See 1 Modern Scientific
Evidence, supra note 23, §§ 19-1.0 to 2.1, at 748-61; Ellman & Kaye, supra note 82, at
1150 (explaining that the method commonly used "is equivalent to supposing that the
universe of possible fathers is already reduced to two equally likely suspects before
considering the HLA test results").
'16Zeisel & Kaye, supra note 16, at 101. These authors give the following example:
That attitude led to monstrosities such as James S. Kirk & Co. v. Federal Trade
Commission[, 59 F.2d 179, 181 (7th Cir. 1932),] in which the manufacturer's
claim that a soap was based on olive oil was challenged. This earth-shaking
issue brought an administrative law judge to Seattle, Washington, where he
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through systematic polls but through the testimony of representa-
tives of the public itself-what the law called "public witnesses. '
Thus, in Irvin v. State.' the Supreme Court of Florida refused to
credit a public opinion survey of community sentiment. Two Afri-
can-American men were convicted of raping a white woman, but
the conviction was set aside after it became clear that the grand
jury that returned the indictments had been selected in a discrimi-
natory fashion.' A new grand jury promptly reindicted the men.
The NAACP commissioned Elmo Roper, one of the pioneers of
American public opinion research, to conduct what was probably
the first large-scale survey of public prejudice in a venue. The trial
court, however, excluded the research director's testimony and de-
clined to change the venue.' The trial ended in a verdict of guilt
and a sentence of death. The Florida Supreme Court upheld the
exclusion of the survey as hearsay and insisted that although a sur-
vey might indicate consumer attitudes toward a product, the
method was "useless" to "indicate an aroused public against a pro-
spective defendant in a court of justice."'" In upholding the refusal
to change the venue, the court preferred to rely on "the friendli-
ness of white people for the colored in the community" as
heard, one by one, the testimony of 700 women as to their understanding of the
manufacturer's message.
Id.
Id. Historically, hearsay has been the major objection to survey evidence. In most
large surveys, many persons are employed to do the interviewing or other forms of
data collection. Furthermore, when opinion polls are at issue, the individuals whose
opinions were sampled are not testifying in court. Various arguments to circumvent or
overcome the hearsay rule have been used by courts electing to receive the evidence.
See, e.g., Tex. Aeronautics Comm'n v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 454 S.W.2d 199, 203
(Tex. 1970) (holding certain evidence "admissible whether it is considered to be
nonhearsay or within the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule"); Hans Zeisel,
The Uniqueness of Survey Evidence, 45 Cornell L.Q. 322, 345-46 (1960) (giving
safeguards that would mitigate the dangers of receiving survey evidence).
66 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 1953).
Id. at 289-90 (citing Shepherd v. State, 341 U.S. 50, 50 (1951)). Justices Robert
Jackson and Felix Frankfurter concurred on the ground that the pretrial publicity had
the effect of informing the jurors of an involuntary confession. Id. at 51 (Jackson &
Frankfurter, JJ., concurring).
90 Irvin, 66 So. 2d at 290. Venue had been changed from the county in which the
alleged crime was committed to a nearby one. Defendants sought to show that this
measure was insufficient. Id.
11 Id. at 292.
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indicated by the testimony of "numerous witnesses" and "the re-
cent construction of an elaborate memorial to a colored soldier."'
In categorically rejecting survey and sampling evidence in Irvin
and other cases, courts have rarely mentioned Frye or any special
standards for scientific evidence. Likewise, the later opinions ad-
mitting survey results did not maintain that Frye was satisfied
because social scientists accepted scientific sampling methods to
produce opinions. To be sure, modem courts are far more hospita-
ble to survey evidence,' but the transformation has been traced to
other developments.'
In criminal cases, the courts have been skeptical of efforts to as-
sign numerical probabilities to events, and often rightly so, but
once again, the usual principles of relevance, rather than the spe-
cial test of general acceptance, have been the vehicle for their
expression." Consider what may be the most famous modem case
of statistical testimony introduced to establish a defendant's guilt.
In People v. Collins,' the Supreme Court of California overturned
a conviction because of a contrived (but unchallenged) attempt to
show that certain traits of a couple apparently fleeing the scene of
a robbery were so uncommon as to be practically conclusive of
guilt. Malcolm Collins and his common-law wife Janet had been
charged with robbing a woman in an alley in the San Pedro area of
Los Angeles. Malcolm was a black man who at one time had worn
a beard and mustache and owned a yellow Lincoln; Janet was a
caucasian woman with blond hair that she wore in a pony tail.
There was no outright confession and no definitive identification of
this couple, but a blond woman with her hair in a pony tail was
9 Id.
93See generally 1 McCormick on Evidence, supra note 25, § 208, at 791-93
(discussing the general admissibility of surveys that are conducted according to
certain accepted principles); Susan J. Becker, Public Opinion Polls and Surveys as
Evidence: Suggestions for Resolving Confusing and Conflicting Standards Governing
Weight and Admissibility, 70 Or. L. Rev. 463 (1991) (discussing the historic treatment
of survey evidence and its recent popularity in courts).
9 See Zeisel & Kaye, supra note 16, at 101 (describing such developments as special
statutes admitting Census Bureau reports based on sampling, Judge Wyzanski's sua
sponte use of sampling in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp.
295, 305 (D. Mass. 1953), and an Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule 703 that
(without mentioning Frye) speaks approvingly of expert opinions based on sampling).
951 McCormick on Evidence, supra note 25, § 210, at 808.
438 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1968).
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seen running from the scene of the robbery and entering a yellow
car driven by a bearded and mustached black many
As in Risley, the prosecutor called a college mathematics instruc-
tor to the stand and had him assume various values for the
frequencies of characteristics like beards, mustaches, interracial
couples, and yellow cars. The mathematician then multiplied these
assumed values to conclude that the joint probability of all these
characteristics in a randomly selected couple would be about
1/12,000,000Y
The California Supreme Court reversed the resulting conviction.
The opinion, which even sported a mathematical appendix, found
at least three errors in the probability testimony: (1) the lack of any
evidentiary foundation for the probabilities used by the mathema-
tician; (2) the lack of a foundation for the independence of the
events whose probabilities were multiplied together; and (3) the
possibility that the jurors were distracted and confused by the
mathematical proof." In Collins and other "no-evidence" cases,"°
"the computations have little basis in fact and are presented in the
guise of expert analysis.''. Such calculations are excluded, not be-
Id. at 34.
*Id. at 37.
'9Id. at 38-39. The first was enough to justify reversal by itself. Echoing Risley, the
court observed that the values used to compute the joint probability were largely
speculative:
[T]he prosecution produced no evidence whatsoever showing, or from which it
could be in any way inferred, that only one out of every ten cars which might
have been at the scene of the robbery was partly yellow, that only one out of
every four men who might have been there wore a mustache, that only one out
of every ten girls who might have been there wore a ponytail, or that any of the
other individual probability factors listed were even roughly accurate.
Id. at 38. Since computations with such numbers have little basis in fact and are
dressed in the garb of expert analysis, they should be excluded under the principle
that their prejudicial impact outweighs their probative value.
10 There was no statistical evidence at all in Collins. There was testimony about the
couple that robbed the woman and testimony about the couple that was arrested, but
there was no evidence about the frequency with which the traits of the guilty couple
would be found in the population of all couples. Rather, the expert merely told the
jury how to evaluate the fact that the Collinses fit the description of the robbers. Id.
at 40. Thus, as far as statistical evidence goes, Collins was actually a "no-evidence"
case. There was no evidence of how common or unusual the various incriminating
characteristics were.
" 1 McCormick on Evidence, supra note 25, § 210, at 808 (internal citation
omitted).
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cause the probability model is not generally accepted among statis-
ticians, but "under the principle that their prejudicial impact
clearly outweighs their probative value."'' "° Although California
was (and remains to this day) a devotee of Frye,1" the Collins opin-
ion contains nary a word about Frye, general acceptance, or the
way that statisticians usually would estimate the probability of an
event like a randomly generated couple sharing all the pertinent
traits attributed to the suspects. The opinion is a relevancy opinion,
pure and simple."°
In this regard, Collins could not be more different than other
opinions of the same court with regard to computations of prob-
abilities of other physical traits attributed to suspects on the basis
of biological trace evidence rather than the reports of witnesses. In
People v. Venegas,°5 a woman was raped in her hotel room. Police
sent vaginal swabs and swatches of a bedspread containing two se-
men stains, along with blood samples from the victim and the
defendant, to an FBI laboratory. The FBI reported that defen-
dant's DNA profile matched the DNA profiles from the swabs and
one of the stains, and the FBI added that "the probability of select-
ing an unrelated individual at random from the Hispanic
population with a profile that also matched the samples was ap-
proximately 1 in 31,000.""1° After a hearing on the general
acceptance of the procedure for arriving at this figure, the trial
court admitted testimony that "the probability of another [ran-
domly selected] person having the DNA profile found in
defendant's blood sample was 1 in 65,000."'' Both the state court
102Id.
103 People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321,323, 331 (Cal. 1994).
,04 Well, not so simple. The court's appendix is a masterpiece of obfuscation, serving
to make a simple point mysterious, and thus buttressing the court's dubious claim that
it was unreasonable to expect defense counsel to recognize and demonstrate the
glaring infirmities in the computations provided in Collins. See Collins, 438 P.2d at
42-43.
105 954 P.2d 525 (Cal. 1998).
1 6 Id. at 530.
107 Id. at 543. The smaller frequency of 1 in 65,000 was calculated with "the modified
ceiling method" for combining the frequencies of each DNA allele as estimated with
"floating bins." Id. In its original report on the case, the FBI used a "fixed bin"
approach. Id. The fixed bin approach also led to estimated frequencies of one in
53,000 for the caucasian population and one in 225,000 for the black population. Id.
For explanations of the binning procedures, see, for example, NRC Report, supra
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of appeals and supreme court agreed that the method for arriving
at the probability had to be generally accepted in the scientific
community. Ultimately, the California Supreme Court held that
the number came from a computational procedure that was not
generally accepted because of an inconsistency between the statis-
tical criterion used in declaring a match and the one used in
estimating the frequencies of matching alleles." Likewise, in Peo-
ple v. Soto," the California Supreme Court looked to general
acceptance in "the relevant scientific community of population ge-
neticists" to conclude that "statistical calculations" for DNA types
using "the unmodified product rule" met the Frye standard for
admissibility."'
One explanation for the unexplained shift from relevancy in
Collins to general acceptance in Soto and Venegas might be that
the probability computations in the DNA cases could not be dis-
missed as utterly devoid of an empirical foundation or a theory that
might justify the independence assumption. Forensic scientists had
compiled some data as to the frequencies of the various alleles that
comprise the more complex genotypes, and geneticists had some
experience and an ample theoretical framework to draw on in in-
ferring genotype frequencies. Although some defendants vainly
argued that Collins precluded any multiplication of probabilities,'
the DNA computations simply could not be dismissed as mani-
festly erroneous and hence irrelevant."' Consequently, a further
argument, such as the lack of general acceptance of the probability
calculations, was necessary if defendants were to block the evi-
dence. Nevertheless, DNA cases stand out as the only instance in
note 16, at 142-45; David H. Kaye, DNA Evidence: Probability, Population Genetics,
and the Courts, 7 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 101, 122-51 (1993).
1 For an exposition of the FBI's error, see 1 Modern Scientific Evidence, supra
note 23, § 15-4.2, at 234-36 (Supp. 2000).
109 981 P.2d 958 (Cal. 1999).
110 Id. at 960.
HI See, e.g., Motion to Exclude DNA Evidence at *52-53, People v. Simpson, 1994
WL 568647 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 5, 1994) (No. BA097211); David H. Kaye, The DNA
Chronicles: Is Simpson Really Collins?, O.J. Simpson Case Commentaries, Nov. 1,
1994, available at 1994 WL 592117.
112 See, e.g., Kaye, supra note 107, at 127-51 (arguing that concern over population
structure is misplaced when the reference population is a broad racial group).
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which courts in Frye jurisdictions have responded to criminal
"probability evidence" with a Frye analysis."3
2. Relevancy-Plus: The Road to Daubert
The general acceptance standard never was popular with evi-
dence scholars," ' and by the 1970s and 1980s, more and more
courts abandoned it in favor of various substitutes."' For example,
in United States v. Williams, 6 the government recorded telephone
conversations initiated by an undercover police officer offering to
buy heroin. At trial, it introduced a spectrographic analysis to
prove that the voice on the recording was the defendant's. In up-
holding the admission of this testimony, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit refused to apply general acceptance as a "uni-
versal[] litmus test for the general admissibility of all 'scientific'
evidence.""7 Instead, the court recited the usual features of rele-
vancy"'8 and concentrated on "reliability."..9 The Second Circuit
concluded that the technique possessed the requisite reliability to
warrant admission in light of the extent of its acceptance in the sci-
entific community and "the potential rate of error."'' "
Some years later, in United States v. Downing,"' the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit expounded at length on this notion
113 Cases from other Frye jurisdictions that do not inquire into general acceptance of
probability calculations for trace evidence include State v. Garrison, 585 P.2d 563, 566
(Ariz. 1978) (allowing a dubious probability estimate for a bite mark), and State v.
Kim, 398 N.W.2d 544, 547, 549 (Minn. 1987) (allowing ABO and PGM typing, but
excluding testimony as to the probability of exclusion as unfairly prejudicial).
114 See, e.g., 1 McCormick on Evidence, supra note 25, § 203, at 727-31.
115 Id. § 203, at 730 & n.35; Giannelli, supra note 61, at 1228-33.
116583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978).
"'Id. at 1197.
118 Id. at 1198 ("[T]he established considerations applicable to the admissibility of
evidence come into play, and the probativeness, materiality, and reliability of the
evidence, on the one side, and any tendency to mislead, prejudice, or confuse the jury
on the other, must be the focal points of inquiry.").
119 Id. at 1198-99. A better term would have been "validity." See, e.g., 1 McCormick
on Evidence, supra note 25, § 203.
'2 Williams, 583 F.2d at 1198-99 (listing several reasons to think that the error rate
should be small). In retrospect, it seems clear that the court was far too sanguine in its
assessment of "reliability." See, e.g., 1 McCormick on Evidence, supra note 25, § 207,
at 789-90 (discussing the questionable validity and reliability of spectrogram
comparisons).
M 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
The Dynamics of Daubert
that the admissibility of scientific evidence requires "a quantum of
reliability beyond that required to meet a standard of bare logical
relevance," and explained that this condition can be fulfilled even
when "the principles underlying the evidence have not become
'generally accepted' in the field to which they belong. ' "" The de-
fendant, who was convicted for fraud on the basis of eyewitness
identifications, was precluded from presenting a psychologist to
testify to experiments on the sources of eyewitness error. The court
of appeals remanded to permit the district court to reconsider its
ruling in light of the criteria for ascertaining admissibility articu-
lated in this repudiation of Frye. Under Downing, "reliability" is "a
critical element of admissibility,""' and the "reliability inquiry"'12 4
can probe the "degree of acceptance within [the scientific] commu-
nity,"" the "existence of a specialized literature dealing with the
technique," '126 and the "rate of error."' "n In addition, Downing called
on the district court to inquire into "another aspect of relevancy"--
"fit," that is, "whether expert testimony proffered in the case is suf-
ficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the jury in
resolving a factual dispute."' '
As Williams and Downing indicate,'29 the major emergent alter-
native to Frye looked to the relevance of the proposed scientific
testimony but demanded something more-relevance plus a cer-
tain extra trustworthiness, accuracy, or fit beyond that needed to
admit nonscientific testimony." ' Statistical evidence, however, was
- Id. at 1235.
- Id. at 1238.




- Id. at 1239.
I'l Id. at 1242.
12 The approach exemplified in these cases was presaged and supported by many
commentators. See, e.g., 3 Jack B. Weinstein et al., Weinstein's Evidence 702[03], at
702-43 to 702-44 (1996); Mark McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New
Approach to Admissibility, 67 Iowa L. Rev. 879 (1982).
"0 Arguably, State v. Brown, 687 P.2d 751 (Or. 1984), is an exception. There, the
Oregon Supreme Court dismissed both "general acceptance" and "reasonably
reliable" as the standards for admitting scientific evidence-in that instance,
polygraph testing. Id. at 759. It also "found the [ordinary] relevancy test not
satisfactory because it is too nebulous." Id. Instead, the court relied on "the
'relevancy' test [as] strengthened by consideration of... seven factors set forth.., in
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rarely held to this standard. The "relevancy-plus" jurisdictions, like
the Frye jurisdictions, either admitted statistical studies with little
comment or excluded them as too flawed to satisfy the more gen-
eral balancing standard of Federal Rule of Evidence 403.131 With
the Supreme Court's opinion in Daubert, however, this situation
would change. The courts would not necessarily demand more of
statistics, but the doctrinal machinery for processing scientific evi-
dence no longer would remain idle or overlooked when statistical
studies were offered.
3. Scientific Soundness: Daubert
After many years of refusing to examine the issue of the admis-
sibility of scientific evidence,132 the Supreme Court granted
certioriari in Daubert to consider whether the general acceptance
standard survived the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
In Daubert, two young children born with deformed limbs and
their parents sought damages against the manufacturer of Bendec-
tin, a prescription drug taken by the boys' mothers to treat nausea
and vomiting during pregnancy. The plaintiffs' case foundered
when they were unable to point to any published epidemiological
studies concluding that Bendectin causes limb reduction defects.
The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment on the ground that the plaintiffs had failed to establish a
genuine issue of material fact regarding causation. As summarized
by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit:
Plaintiffs' evidence of causation consisted primarily of expert
opinion based on in vitro and in vivo animal tests, chemical
structure analyses and the reanalysis of epidemiological studies.
Among the contrary evidence proffered by Merrell Dow was
3 Weinstein's Evidence 702[03], pp. 702-15 to 702-21 (1982)" to "provide structure
and guidance." Brown, 687 P.2d at 759. Consideration of these factors does not
necessarily imply that scientific evidence must be especially probative; nonetheless,
the factors lend themselves to being applied so as to demand greater reliability than
would be needed to admit nonscientific evidence. Thus, Brown and cases like it
probably are best classified as part of the "relevancy-plus" camp.
1
3 Fed. R. Evid. 403 (stating that "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence").
E.g., Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 503 U.S. 912 (1992) (denying
certiorari for this case involving the standard of admissibility for an expert opinion).
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the affidavit of a physician and epidemiologist who reviewed all
of the available literature on the subject, which included more
than 30 published studies involving over 130,000 patients, and
concluded that no published epidemiological study had demon-
strated a statistically significant association between Bendectin
and birth defects. Plaintiffs do not challenge this summary of
the published record.'33
The trial court in Daubert excluded all four categories of the
plaintiffs' evidence-so-called "structure-activity studies,"'34 in vi-
tro or animal cell experiments,'35 in vivo or live animal research,
36
and reanalysis of the epidemiological data. These rulings on ad-
missibility were based on two lines of reasoning. First, the district
and circuit courts held that, absent scientific understanding of the
cause of the birth defects in question, causation may only be shown
through epidemiological evidence.' Second, both courts refused to
allow the recalculated epidemiological data offered by plaintiffs'
experts because, unlike the studies "rejected by [the plaintiffs' ex-
perts, which] had been published in peer-reviewed scientific
'33Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1129 (9th Cir. 1991)
(emphasis omitted), vacated by 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
13 Five of plaintiffs' experts were willing to opine that the similarity of chemical
structure between ingredients in Bendectin and known teratogens constituted
evidence that Bendectin caused birth defects. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.,
727 F. Supp. 570, 574-75 (S.D. Cal. 1989), affd, 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated
by 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Brief for Petitioners at 4-5, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms.,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (No. 92-102) [hereinafter Petitioners' Brief].
01 These experiments showed that the ingredients in Bendectin caused minor DNA
damage to cells in culture or inhibited limb bud cell differentiation. Turpin v. Merrell
Dow Pharms., Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1358 (6th Cir. 1992); Brock v. Merrell Dow
Pharms., Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 313-14 (5th Cir. 1989), modified by 884 F.2d 166;
Petitioners' Brief, supra note 134, at 4.
176These were studies of fetal defects in pregnant animals such as rats, rabbits, and
monkeys. See Turpin, 959 F.2d at 1358-59; Brock, 874 F.2d at 314; Petioners' Brief,
supra note 134, at 4.
,- After some of the reported instances of injury or noninjury following use of the
drug were reclassified, the correlation between drug-usage and birth defects became
statistically significant. Daubert, 951 F.2d at 1130-31 (discussing plaintiffs' "reanalysis
of epidemiological studies" in general terms); Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,
857 F.2d 823, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (noting that one expert obtained "what he deems a
statistically significant result" only "by recalculating").
1 Daubert, 727 F. Supp. at 572,575; Daubert, 951 F.2d at 1131.
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journals," the plaintiffs' experts had "neither published [their] re-
calculations nor offered them for [peer] review."'39
The Supreme Court unanimously held that the lower courts had
applied the wrong standard for the admissibility of scientific evi-
dence. In an opinion by Justice Harry A. Blackmun, the Court
proclaimed that the "austere [general acceptance] standard, absent
from and incompatible with, the Federal Rules of Evidence, should
not be applied in federal trials."'" In reaching this conclusion, the
Court made no effort to analyze the substance or merits of the
general acceptance standard, but relied instead on the fact that nei-
ther the wording nor the drafting history of the rules of evidence
evinced "any clear indication that Rule 702 or the Rules as a whole
were intended to incorporate a 'general acceptance' standard. 14
Having jettisoned general acceptance as "the exclusive test for
admitting expert scientific testimony,'" the Court adopted the
richer and more flexible 3 "relevancy-plus" standard already em-
ployed in many jurisdictions.'" It announced that as the gatekeeper
- 'Daubert, 727 F. Supp. at 573, 575-76 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation
omitted) (quoting Richardson, 857 F.2d at 831). Most other circuits had reached the
same result on the admissibility of testimony that Bendectin is a teratogen. These
opinions, however, are better understood as addressing the sufficiency of the scientific
evidence on causation to support a verdict for plaintiffs. See Michael D. Green,
Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The
Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 643 (1992);
Samuel R. Gross, Substance and Form in Scientific Evidence: What Daubert Didn't
Do, in Reforming the Civil Justice System 234 (Larry Kraemer ed., 1996); cf. Joseph
Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass Torts, 43
Hastings L.J. 301 (1992) (describing how law and science have interacted and
advanced through the course of the Bendectin litigation).
140 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
11 Id. at 588. This aspect of the majority opinion is consistent with the Court's often
mechanical approach to interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence. See generally
Glen Weissenberger, The Supreme Court and the Interpretation of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, 53 Ohio St. L.J. 1307 (1992) (criticizing this jurisprudence). The more
convincing view is that the rules left the viability of the general acceptance standard
open to further common law development. See, e.g., Downing, 753 F.2d at 1235
(concluding that "the Federal Rules of Evidence neither incorporate it nor repudiate
it"); Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1111, 1115-16 (5th Cir.
1991) (en banc); Paul Giannelli, Daubert: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence,
15 Cardozo L. Rev. 1999,2002,2016-19 (1994).
'42Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
"4 Id. at 594 (citation omitted) ("The inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is... a flexible
one.").
14 See supra Section I.B.2.
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of evidence, "the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific
testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable."45
This "evidentiary reliability," as the Court put it, presumes "scien-
tific knowledge"' 6-the proffered testimony must be "ground[ed]
in the methods and procedures of science."'47 In a further elabora-
tion, the Court suggested that this "reliability" determination
"entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or
methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid
and ... properly can be applied to the facts in issue."'" This, in
turn, depends on such things as "whether it can be (and has been)
tested," "whether the theory or technique has been subjected to
peer review and publication," "the known or potential rate of er-
ror," and the "degree of acceptance within [a relevant scientific]
community." '149
Moreover, the Court suggested, a showing of scientific validity is
not enough, for "Rule 702's 'helpfulness' standard requires a valid
scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to
admissibility."'" Drawing directly on Downing, the Court observed
that "whether expert testimony proffered in the case is sufficiently
tied to the facts of the case.., has been aptly described by Judge
Becker as one of 'fit.""''  As a logical matter, however, the fit re-
quirement is superfluous. "Purpose" is already built into the
definition of "validity." For example, the LSAT has been shown to
" Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice John
Paul Stevens dissented from this part of the opinion. They would have decided only
the Frye issue and left "the further development of this important area of the law to
future cases." Id. at 601 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The opinion of the Chief Justice, joined by Justice Stevens, stated: "I do not doubt
that Rule 702 confides to the judge some gatekeeping responsibility in deciding
questions of the admissibility of proffered expert testimony." Id. at 600 (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). With some justification, however, they
complained that the majority's pronouncements were "general, ... vague and
abstract." Id. at 598 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
14, Id. at 590-91.
147 Id. at 590.
1' Id. at 592-93. Likewise, the Court cautioned that "to qualify as 'scientific
knowledge,' an inference or assertion must be derived by the scientific method.
Proposed testimony must be supported by appropriate validation-i.e., 'good
grounds,' based on what is known." Id. at 590.
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be valid for the purpose of predicting grades in the first year of law
school.52 The test is not valid for predicting monetary success as a
lawyer. 53 But even if "fit" is implicit in scientific validity, the dis-
cussion in Daubert is an important reminder that "scientific validity
for one purpose is not necessarily scientific validity for other, unre-
lated purposes.""
The impact of Daubert far exceeds its substance. The opinion
adds little to the relevancy-plus standard developed in the decades
preceding it.55 Nevertheless, lower courts were stunned. One dis-
trict court exclaimed that "[t]he rules governing the admissibility of
expert testimony have recently undergone dramatic change."'6 On
the remand in Daubert itself, Judge Alex Kozinski spoke of the
"Brave New World" 57 that the court faced."s Invoking the meta-
phor of "gatekeeping"-hardly a new concept in the law of
152 Linda F. Wightman, Predictive Validity of the LSAT: A National Summary of the
1990-1992 Correlation Studies 9-10 (1993); cf. Linda F. Wightman & David G.
Muller, An Analysis of Differential Validity and Differential Prediction for Black,
Mexican-American, Hispanic, and White Law School Students 11-13 (1990); David
Kaye, Searching for Truth About Testing, 90 Yale L.J. 431 (1980) (book review).
13 One always can attack the evidence strictly in terms of the proof of scientific
validity (as indicated by reference to the specific Daubert factors) for a particular
purpose. The Court's example of a valid scientific knowledge that should be excluded
for lack of fit illustrates this point. Justice Blackmun wrote that:
The study of the phases of the moon, for example, may provide valid scientific
"knowledge" about whether a certain night was dark, and if darkness is a fact in
issue, the knowledge will assist the trier of fact. However (absent creditable
grounds supporting such a link), evidence that the moon was full on a certain
night will not assist the trier of fact in determining whether an individual was
unusually likely to have behaved irrationally on that night.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591. One can say, as the Court does, that knowledge of darkness
does not "fit" the facts of the case (which involve irrationality). Or, one can proceed
exclusively under the "reliability" prong of Daubert by saying that the theory that the
full moon causes irrational behavior lacks validity.
154 Id.
5 Indeed, the similarities in the standard for admissibility described in Daubert and
the standard articulated by Judge Becker in Downing are striking.
1- Ohio v. Louis Trauth Dairy, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 1247,1250 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
17 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir. 1995). The
task of ascertaining relevance and reliability, he suggested, was "complex and
daunting," "difficult," "uncomfortable," and "heady." Id. at 1315-16.
11 In the end, the Ninth Circuit adhered to its initial decision on the ground that
even if the reanalyses were admissible under the principles articulated by the
Supreme Court, they showed too small an association between exposure and birth
defects to establish specific causation. Id. at 1320-22.
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evidence 159-courts began to re-examine seemingly settled results
as to the admissibility of many forms of scientific testimony."w
Some scientific evidence was admitted more readily,61 but much
was reviewed with a newfound skepticism and a sense of disquiet.
In particular, pretrial motions to exclude statistical testimony be-
came commonplace. 2 Along with the shift in focus from weight to
'1 See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger, Expert Testimony: The Supreme Court's Rules,
Issues in Sci. & Tech., Summer 2000, at 57,58. As that article explains:
Perhaps the most significant part of Daubert is the Court's anointment of the
trial judge as the "gatekeeper" who must screen proffered expertise to
determine whether the relevancy and reliability prongs are met. Although there
was nothing particularly novel about a trial judge having the power to exclude
inappropriate expert testimony, Daubert stressed that the trial court has an
obligation to act as gatekeeper even though some courts would rather have left
this task to the jury, especially when the screening entailed complex scientific
issues.
Id.
1 E.g., United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 227 (9th Cir. 1997) (concluding that
"our per se rule excluding the admission of unstipulated polygraph evidence was
effectively overruled by Daubert"); United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428,429 (5th Cir.
1995) (concluding that "the rationale underlying this circuit's per se rule against
admitting polygraph evidence did not survive Daubert").
6 See, e.g., United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 562 (6th Cir. 1993) (upholding the
admission of DNA evidence notwithstanding seemingly substantial scientific
controversies).
1 2 See, e.g., Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 301 (5th Cir.) (plaintiffs' expert's statistical
analysis properly excluded as unreliable under Daubert for problems ranging "from
particular miscalculations to his general approach to the analysis" including tables
that did not add to anywhere near 100% and failure to perform a regression analysis
and thereby account for pertinent variables), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 812 (2000);
Johnson Elec. N.A., Inc. v. Mabuchi Motor Am. Corp., 103 F. Supp. 2d 268, 282-86
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (invoking Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho to exclude a "speculative"
and "preposterous" econometric model for estimating demand in a patent
infringment case "despite its dazzling sheen of erudition and meticulous
methodology"); In re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litig., 2000-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) [ 72,981, at 88,341, 88,349 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 27, 2000) (denying motion to permit
interlocutory review of pretrial ruling to admit economist's testimony about prices
based on regression said to omit an important variable); Allapattah Servs., Inc. v.
Exxon Corp., 61 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1353 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (admitting econometric
testimony under modified Daubert analysis); In re Indus. Silicon Antitrust Litig., No.
95-2104, 1998 WL 1031507, at *2-3 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 1998) (holding that a "before
and after" regression analysis satisfies Daubert and Bazemore); Estate of Bud Hill v.
Conagra Poultry Co., No. CIV.A.4:94CV0198-HLM, 1997 WL 538887, at *6-9 (N.D.
Ga. Aug. 25, 1997) (denying motion to exclude economist's regression study to
determine whether chickens were misweighed); Diehl v. Xerox Corp., 933 F. Supp.
1157, 1167-68 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (denying motion to exclude simple comparisons
rather than regressions to show disparate impact); Newport Ltd. v. Sears, Roebuck &
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admissibility came a series of problems involving the structure,
reach, and appellate review of the heightened scrutiny of scientific,
expert testimony-and two more Supreme Court opinions on these
issues.
C. The Puzzles of Strict Scrutiny
1. The Boundary Problem
If scientific evidence must clear a hurdle that does not block the
path of other expert testimony, the problem of demarcating
boundaries arises. What evidence counts as "scientific" for the
purpose of Frye, Daubert, or any other such standard? Advocates
have implored courts to apply heightened scrutiny to a myriad of
claims. Some items, such as agglutination or electrophoresis of
blood or the spectrographic analysis of voices, seem indisputably
"scientific." Courts have not hesitated to apply the special stan-
dards to testimony about such technologies.163 Other testimony,
such as the opinion of a psychiatrist that a person's will is over-
borne by a compulsion to gamble,' seems less easy to classify. In
these borderline cases, courts have reached apparently conflicting
results; few opinions have provided clear or comprehensive expla-
nations of how the line was drawn."
Co., No. 86-2319, 1995 WL 328158, at *2 (E.D. La. May 30, 1995) (denying Daubert
motion to exclude calculations of lost profits involving "the absorption rate of
industrial park land" based on multiple regression model because regression in
general and as used to estimate lost profits in other contexts is accepted and valid). Of
course, some of the testimony excluded as a result of pretrial "Daubert motions"
might have been excluded at trial in the pre-Daubert era, but the growth in pretrial
attacks indicates the enhanced sensitivity of lawyers and courts to the issue of
admissibility.
16E.g., Michael R. Flaherty, Annotation, Admissibility, in Criminal Cases, of
Evidence of Electrophoresis of Dried Evidentiary Bloodstains, 66 A.L.R.4th 588,
605-09 (1988); cf. People v. Coleman, 759 P.2d 1260, 1277 (Cal. 1988) (holding that a
positive hemostick test for the presence of blood was improperly admitted when the
prosecution did not establish that the hemostick was a generally accepted method for
detecting blood).
14 United States v. Lewellyn, 723 F.2d 615, 619-20 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that a
defendant claiming insanity due to pathological gambling must show that the mental
health community generally accepts the principles underpinning his theory).
11 David E. Bernstein, The Science of Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology, 2
Psychiatry, Psychol. & L. 75, 78 (1995).
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Statistical evidence, it seems, is such a borderline case. For in-
stance, in Ohio v. Louis Trauth Dairy, Inc., 6 a federal district court
noted that econometrics and statistics were simply methods applied
to produce knowledge in substantive disciplines. As such, the court
concluded that "[n]either economics or statistics seems to com-
pletely qualify as 'scientific knowledge"' for purposes of Daubert67
In the textualist style of Daubert, this opinion seeks to resolve the
boundary problem by asking what scientists (rather than statisti-
cians) "know." Statistical reasoning, however, is crucial to most
scientific inquiry-indeed, some would say that it is the essence of
all inductive scientific reasoning. It is required of (although not al-
ways mastered by) students of the "hard" as well as the softer
sciences. Although statistical modeling is as much art as science,1"
statistical techniques and tests have well-defined mathematical
properties described in an active research literature. In a word, it is
not a misnomer to speak of "statistical science."'69 From this per-
spective, it would seem that the focus in Trauth Dairy on whether
statistical expertise is a substantive, empirical science like physics,
astronomy, or psychology misses the mark.
Yet, this conclusion may be too facile. What, one might well ask,
are the unstated criteria being used to separate "science" from
other knowledge? At first glance, philosophical studies of the na-
ture and structure of scientific theories might seem to hold the key
16 925 F. Supp. 1247 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
167 Id. at 1252. Nevertheless, the court followed the rule in the Sixth Circuit, which
anticipated the result in Kumho, to conclude that various statistical studies said to
indicate a price-fixing conspiracy were admissible under Daubert as "modified in the
case of social science or other non-scientific expertise." Id. The federal District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama excluded similar studies by the same expert in
an unrelated case, but in City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chemicals, Inc., 158 F.3d 548
(11th Cir. 1998), the Eleventh Circuit held most of that evidence admissible under
Daubert. Id. at 563.
6,See, e.g., Lincoln E. Moses, The Reasoning of Statistical Inference, in
Perspectives on Contemporary Statistics 107, 117-18 (David C. Hoaglin & David S.
Moore eds., 1992).
' The phrase is the title of a respected journal. See also Statistical Science in the
Courtroom, supra note 19 (discussing various uses of statistics in litigation). Of
course, admissibility of particular applications of the "science" of statistics depends on
much more than the existence of a procedure with well-defined mathematical
properties. See infra Part II.
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to this puzzle. Indeed, the Daubert Court started down this road'
when it cited Sir Karl Popper's criteria for distinguishing science
from metaphysics. 17 ' Nevertheless, the basis for drawing a line be-
tween expert scientific evidence and other expert testimony is not
to be found in abstract definitions of "science." The writings of
David Hume, Immanuel Kant, A.J. Ayer, Sir Karl Popper, Thomas
Kuhn, and many other philosophers or historians provide brilliant
insights into the nature of scientific knowledge, but they do not
speak directly to the legal issues."7 Enriching as the philosophical
literature on the nature and aims of science might be, it is unlikely
to be of great assistance in deciding when a special test for scien-
tific evidence should be applied. The reason, as Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes once remarked, is that "[a] word is... the skin of
a living thought."" Words are the visible surface of rules that are
designed to achieve certain goals. Abstract definitions may or may
not fit these goals.'
Thus, a functional inquiry, rather than a review of the philoso-
phical literature, the encyclopedia, or the dictionary is required.
The rules of evidence, whether derived from the common law or a
code, are designed to perform certain functions, and the raison
d'etre of a special hurdle for scientific evidence is that this particu-
lar evidence poses special problems. When these problems are not
present, heightened scrutiny is not justified and may well be coun-
7 See generally Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due
Process, 107 Yale L.J. 1535, 1547-50 (1998) (describing the Daubert Court's attempts
to discern the philosophical boundaries of Federal Rule 702's reference to "scientific
knowledge").
17 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
1 But see Kenneth R. Foster & Peter W. Huber, Judging Science: Scientific
Knowledge and the Federal Courts (1997) (collecting literature on how science is
practiced to identify criteria for ascertaining knowledge that is scientific and that can
be relied upon).
113 Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
174 Some writers, harking back to an older tradition, define "science" as
"classification" or "a coherent, systematic body of knowledge, combining particular
facts with general principles." Mike Townsend, Implications of Foundational Crises in
Mathematics: A Case Study in Interdisciplinary Legal Research, 71 Wash. L. Rev. 51,
58 (1996); Harold J. Berman & Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Transformation of English
Legal Science: From Hale to Blackstone, 45 Emory L.J. 437,440 (1996). Perhaps such
a broad conception of science, which could encompass religion, law, and art history, is
helpful in some contexts, but it is of no use here.
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terproductive, unnecessarily consuming resources and possibly re-
sulting in unwarranted exclusion of probative evidence.
The major arguments for and against heightened scrutiny of sci-
entific evidence were rehearsed earlier.75 The principal problem is
not that it is difficult for lay factfinders to assess an expert's reason-
ing or conclusions without possessing the underlying expertise.
That much is true of all expert testimony. If there is a rationale for
a special rule for scientific experts, it must be something special
about science that justifies stricter scrutiny. Three features of scien-
tific expert testimony provide this rationale: (1) Science is
generally more difficult to understand than other areas of exper-
tise;176 (2) science is not only relatively impenetrable, but it is more
impressive than non-scientific evidence, posing a special danger
that jurors will give too much weight to evidence that carries with it
the trappings of scientific truth;" and (3) until a period of rigorous
testing passes, few scientists will be available to testify to the limi-
tations or risks of errors in a scientific analysis. As a result, the
usual safeguards of the trial process-cross-examination and op-
posing testimony-may be unavailable or ineffective.
With these reasons for an especially demanding screening of sci-
entific evidence in mind, the boundary problem becomes tractable.
The court should consider whether these three concerns are pre-
", See supra Section I.B.1.
176 Some opinion polling research suggests that a large fraction of the U.S. populace
does not appreciate basic scientific ideas. See, e.g., Paul Recer, Most Americans
Support Scientific Research, Poll Finds, Portland Oregonian, July 2, 1998, at A13
(stating that a survey conducted for the National Science Foundation found that 61%
of U.S. adults thought lasers work by focusing sound waves, 49% thought that
humans lived at the same time as dinosaurs, 52% thought that the earth orbits the sun
in one day or one month rather than one year, and 89% were unable to define a
molecule); Rebecca Zacks, What Are They Thinking?, Sci. Am., Oct. 1997, at 34
(giving the results of surveys and interviews with 1,200 freshmen at ten colleges
indicating that approximately 45% reject the theory of evolution). Other polls show
that people form beliefs on the basis of evidence that most scientists would find
unconvincing. E.g., Poll: U.S. Hiding Knowledge of Aliens, CNN Interactive, at
http://www.cnn.comIUS/9706/15/ufo.poll/index.html (June 15, 1997) (reporting that
64% of Americans believe that creatures from elsewhere in the universe have
contacted human beings, and 50% believe that aliens have abducted humans);
Richard Ruelas, 10% in State Look to Skies, See UFOs, Ariz. Republic, July 26, 1997,
at Al (reporting that 9% of people polled in Maricopa County, Arizona's most
populous and urbanized region, say they have seen what they "really believe to be
spaceships from other planets in the Arizona sky").
"' See supra note 27.
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sent in sufficient degree to warrant heightened scrutiny. Under this
approach to the boundary problem, mathematical modeling of
physical or biological processes such as the flow of water 78 or the
survival of wildlife,'79 applications of mathematical equations that
yield computer enhancement of images,"8 or statistical or econo-
metric modeling of many types of data' might seem to qualify for
heightened scrutiny." Although these methods do not involve so-
phisticated laboratory instruments, they can be inscrutable and
impressive to the uninitiated. It is not easy to shrug off a "best fit"
or a "maximum likelihood estimate." Indeed, as we have seen, the
California Supreme Court once was so moved by a trivial and in-
adequately countered bit of mathematics as to brand mathematics
"a veritable sorcerer in our computerized society. ' 13
Nevertheless, it is not clear that Frye or Daubert (or some vari-
ant) should be applied to particular forms of mathematical and
statistical modeling. Unlike a new chemical test or a novel physical
theory or instrument, which might require significant time and ex-
perimental effort to probe, the adequacy, limits, or untested
assumptions of most mathematical and statistical models can be de-
fined fairly readily by other experts. Consequently, effective
opposing testimony is generally available (if the economics of the
178 See, e.g., United States v. Sargent County Water Res. Dist., 876 F. Supp. 1090,
1095 (D.N.D. 1994) (using the "HEC-2" computer model to show the flow of water
through a drain); Am. Water Dev., Inc. v. City of Alamosa, 874 P.2d 352, 368 (Colo.
1994) (en bane) (questioning the credibility of competing models of geologic and
hydrologic features).
179 E.g., Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291, 1320-21 (W.D. Wash.
1994) (discussing northern spotted owl population dynamics), affd, 80 F.3d 1401
(1996).
'l Cf. United States v. Quinn, 18 F.3d 1461, 1464-65 (9th Cir. 1994) (admitting
"photogrammetry" testimony about computer-assisted calculations involving a rate of
change in the sizes of receding objects as compared to objects of known size, over
defense request for a hearing on the soundness of the technique).
181See, e.g., Statistical Methods in Discrimination Litigation, supra note 14;
Rubinfeld, supra note 19, at 200-03 (suggesting guidelines for courts to use when
evaluating the qualifications of, and methodologies used by, experts in regression
analysis); Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Econometrics in the Courtroom, 85 Colum. L. Rev.
1048, 1049 (1985) (arguing that "instead of accepting statistical rules of thumb such as
the five percent significance test, courts should use an instrumentalist, efficiency-
oriented criterion for determining appropriate standards of proof").
12 Commentators have assumed as much without discussion. See, e.g., Mueller &
Kirkpatrick, supra note 27, § 7.8, at 991-92.
183 People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33, 33 (Cal. 1968).
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case warrant it). It is unlikely that jurors will be overwhelmed with
one side's set of equations when the other side can produce an-
other set of equations or results. Indeed, triers of fact sometimes
seem as ready to embrace fallacious criticisms of models as to rec-
ognize valid objections to them. Thus, condition (3) does not hold,
and the import of condition (2) is unclear in this context.
In the end, however, it is condition (1) that should be decisive;
statistical studies should not be exempt from careful scrutiny under
standards like general acceptance or scientific soundness. As with
Gresham's Law, bad statistical proof drives out (or at least deval-
ues) the good.'" The perception that statistics can prove anything,
combined with the typical aversion to mathematics, makes it all too
easy for quite dubious statistical analyses to appear the equal of far
sounder assessments. ' If the end result of a liberal policy of admis-
sibility is the proverbial battle of the experts, with jurors no better
able to decide the case when the fighting ceases, then the cost of
the campaign is a dead-weight loss." For these reasons, complex
statistical testimony warrants some level of heightened scrutiny.
In the discussion that follows, I consider how the scrutiny re-
quired under Daubert and Frye should be applied to such studies.
In federal jurisdictions, however, the Supreme Court's decision in
1'l Named for Sir Thomas Gresham (1519-79), the law states that "if two coins are in
circulation whose relative face values differ from their relative bullion content, the
'dearer' coin will be extracted from circulation for melting down." Hence, the law
often is abbreviated to "bad money drives out good." Graham Bannock et al., The
Penguin Dictionary of Economics (1998).
', See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1119 (7th Cir. 1999) (Easterbrook,
J., concurring) ("Delivering a graduate level statistical-methods course to jurors is
impractical, yet without it a barrage of expert testimony may leave the jurors more
befuddled than enlightened. Many lawyers think that experts neutralize each other,
leaving the jurors where they were before the process began. Many lawyers think that
the best (most persuasive) experts are those who have taken acting lessons and have
deep voices, rather than those who have done the best research.").
WIt might be thought that a similar loss arises when two valid ways to look at the
data lead to opposite conclusions. However, highly probative evidence should not be
excluded because the opposing party also has strong evidence. For example, credible
witnesses often have different recollections of the same conversation. Unless the
evidence is in the range where its probative value is substantially outweighed by its
prejudicial effect or other counterweights to its admission-a judgment that can
sometimes be made with specialized, categorical rules in lieu of ad hoc balancing-a




Kumho Tire Co. v. Carnichael"' relieves the pressure to define a
clear boundary between science and nonscience. There, the Court
wrote that all expert testimony must meet the "reliability" standard
announced in Daubert, but that not all the factors used to ascertain
scientific validity might apply, or they might apply differently to
other areas of expertise. Kumho arose in response to a fatal auto-
mobile accident caused by a tire failure. The district court excluded
an engineer's testimony that a manufacturing defect led to a sepa-
ration between the tire tread and an internal structure, known as a
steel-belted carcass, causing a blowout. This court applied the
standard for scientific evidence described in Daubert to find that
the engineer's analysis of his "visual inspection" of the tire lacked a
sound "scientific basis."'" The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit reversed the resulting summary judgment on the theory
that "a Daubert analysis applies only where an expert relies on the
application of scientific principles, rather than on skill- or experi-
ence-based observation. '
In an opinion written by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Supreme
Court reversed the court of appeals and held that the district
court's exclusion of the engineer's analysis was not an abuse of dis-
cretion." Every Justice agreed that Federal Rule 702 means that a
witness testifying as an expert must present expert "knowledge"' 91
rather than speculation, and that "where such testimony's factual
basis, data, principles, methods, or their application are called suf-
ficiently into question,... the trial judge must determine whether
the testimony has 'a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience
526 U.S. 137 (1999).
I Id. at 146.
' Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131
F.3d 1433, 1436 (11th Cir. 1997) rev'd, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137
(1999)).
190 Only Justice Stevens dissented, and even he joined most of the majority opinion.
He would have remanded the case to the court of appeals to decide whether the trial
court had abused its discretion under the principles outlined in the majority opinion.
Id. at 159 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
191 Id. at 147. The rule stated that: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Id. (quoting
Fed. R. Evid. 702 (prior to 2000 amendment)).
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of [the relevant] discipline.""'  Finally, the Court wrote that, in
making the determination that the expert was providing specialized
knowledge that was sound enough to assist the trier of fact, the
trial judge "may consider [the] more specific factors [enumerated
in] Daubert."'
In short, Kumho extends Daubert's call for "evidentiary reliabil-
ity" and "a valid... connection to the pertinent inquiry as a
precondition to admissibility-"]'" to all expert testimony, but it dis-
cerns no universal solvent for ascertaining the validity of putative
expert knowledge.9  Some assurance of validity is required even
from "experts in drug terms, handwriting analysis, criminal modus
operandi, land valuation, agricultural practices, railroad proce-
dures, attorney's fee valuation, and others,"'" but in such situations
the details of Daubert may not apply,1" and it is unclear what
Kumho demands.'" When it comes to engineering analysis that
"rests upon scientific foundations,'. however, Kumho strongly
suggests that the central considerations articulated in Daubert-the
extent to which a theory or technique has been tested and sub-
jected to critical scientific inquiry-are vital.2"
192 Id. at 149 (alteration in original) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592).
1%, Id. at 149-50 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592).
114 Id. at 149 (omission in original) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Daubert,
509 U.S. at 592).
"'The Court states that:
[T]he trial judge must have considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case
how to go about determining whether particular expert testimony is reliable.
That is to say, a trial court should consider the specific factors identified in
Daubert where they are reasonable measures of the reliability of expert
testimony.
Id. at 152.
19 Id. at 150 (emphasis omitted).
19 Id.
1 The three concurring Justices who also joined the majority opinion cautioned that
although "the Daubert factors are not holy writ, in a particular case the failure to
apply one or another of them may be unreasonable, and hence an abuse of
discretion." Id. at 159 (Scalia, O'Connor, and Thomas, JJ., concurring). But which
cases are these? How can we tell whether real expertise exists unless the theories,
techniques, and their practitioners have been subject to meaningful testing? For
discussion of these questions, see Joseph Sanders, Kumho and How We Know, 64
Law & Contemp. Probs. 373 (2001).
19, Kumho, 526 U.S. at 150.
'°The Kumho Court intimates that trial judges should be fairly demanding, as was
the district court in Kumho itself. The Court pointedly observes that:
Virginia Law Review
The same principle should govern the use of statistical methods.
The statistical theory or technique should be one that has been
subjected to sufficient study to establish its validity as applied to a
class of problems that includes the one being investigated in the
litigation. °t Whether such a method is being applied properly to
the problem at hand is a separate question that the Supreme Court,
regrettably, has conflated with the issue of the validity of the
method itself.' I turn now to that topic.
2. The Usurpation Problem and the Methodology-Conclusion
Puzzle
Before Daubert, it was clear that the elevated scrutiny reserved
for scientific evidence applied to the methodology that an expert
employed rather than the conclusions that the expert reached by
applying that methodology to specific facts. When heightened
scrutiny is confined to methodology, the usurpation problem is
manageable. Jurors are free to accept or reject particular conclu-
sions as long as they are derived with an acceptable methodology
and not otherwise subject to exclusion." In Frye v. United
[S]ome of Daubert's questions can help to evaluate the reliability even of
experience-based testimony. In certain cases, it will be appropriate for the trial
judge to ask, for example, how often an engineering expert's experience-based
methodology has produced erroneous results, or whether such a method is
generally accepted in the relevant engineering community.
Id. at 151.
201 Cf. Richard 0. Lempert, The Jury and Scientific Evidence, 9 Kan. J.L. & Pub.
Pol'y 22, 23 (1999) ("At least so long as the expert's field is one requiring technical
knowledge of a type that might be validated by science (compare a tire expert with,
for example, an expert on fly fishing), the judge's role should be the same [as in
Daubert].").
2 It has been argued that the Court's treatment of the evidence in Kumho suffers
from this flaw:
[W]hen I first read the trial judge's decision in Kumho Tire and the Court of
Appeals' decision that reversed the trial judge, I thought that this was a "junk
science" case, and it had been correctly decided. But after reading the briefs
from both sides, looking for what seemed to be the likely facts, I began to think
that the plaintiff's evidence in Kumho Tire was not "junk science" at all. It turns
out that the methods used by the plaintiff's expert were the same as those used
by the defendant's expert; they just reached different conclusions.
Id. at 26.
20 Committing the threshold question of the adequacy of the methods to judges
rather than juries is a sensible procedural response to the need to screen out
inadequately validated scientific evidence. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Judge Versus
Jury: Who Should Decide Questions of Preliminary Facts Conditioning the
1972 [Vol. 87:1933
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States,.' 4 for example, the court of appeals spoke of "testimony de-
duced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery"2 5
and the need to ensure that "the thing from which the deduction is
made [has been] sufficiently established to have gained general ac-
ceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." ' The court
upheld the exclusion of the psychologist's testimony, not because
of doubts about how well he conducted the test on the defendant,
but because "the systolic blood pressure deception test has not yet
gained such standing and scientific recognition."2' If the expert's
reasoning were recast in syllogistic form,' it might proceed along
the following lines:
Major Premise P,: All subjects whose systolic blood pressure
remains constant as they answer questions about their
alleged participation in crimes are answering truthfully.
Minor Premise P2: The systolic blood pressure of Alphonse
Frye, who was accused of a crime, remained constant as he
asserted his innocence in answering questions about the
murder.
Conclusion C: Frye was telling the truth when he denied
committing the murder.
Only the major premise P1 is subject to general acceptance
"among physiological and psychological authorities."' The minor
premise P2, which is specific to the case, is more like the testimony
of any other witness about his or her observations. It is not an ex-
pression of esoteric scientific reasoning, and it would make little
sense to ask whether the scientific community generally accepts a
case-specific proposition such as the particular blood pressure
Admissibility of Scientific Evidence?, 25 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 577 (1984);
Imwinkelried, supra note 7.
204 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
2 6 Id. at 1014.
2Id.
Id.
21 The syllogistic formulation is offered for heuristic purposes. Cf. Hand, supra note
22, at 51 (describing the expert's role in supplying "the major premise"). The
reasoning is inductive, not deductive. See Brian Skyrms, Choice and Chance: An
Introduction to Inductive Logic 6-7 (3d ed. 1986).
",Frye, 293 F. at 1014; cf. Glastetter v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 252 F.3d 986, 989
(8th Cir. 2001) ("Although this chain of medical reasoning appears sound, its major
premise remains unproven. Glastetter's experts failed to produce scientifically
convincing evidence that Parlodel causes vasoconstriction.").
2001] 1973
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readings taken from a single individual. Ordinary procedures like
cross-examination can test whether the witness is speaking truth-
fully when he testifies that defendant's blood pressure did not
rise.
210
In some respects, this dichotomy between the major and minor
premises is oversimplified to bring out the methodology-conclusion
distinction as sharply as possible."' 1 The complications, however, do
not affect the basic point. Indeed, they help enucleate the principle
that underlies the distinction between conclusion and methodol-
ogy. Among other things, a full analysis would recognize that, in
addition to deducing C (that Frye was telling the truth), Marston
deduced the minor premise P2 from another logical argument
about the sphygmograph used to chart Frye's blood pressure. That
argument might have as its major premise a claim P,' that the in-
strument Marston used was capable of recording systolic blood
pressure accurately. The minor premise P2' of the supplemental ar-
gument would relate to the measurements that Marston made on
Frye himself. The general acceptance test would apply to this addi-
tional major premise P,' about the ability of the instrument to
measure blood pressure, but not to the case-specific minor premise
P2' about the sphygmogram obtained in this particular case. The
latter could be tested by having an opposing expert explain how
the recording could have erroneously reflected the true blood pres-
sure curve or by cross-examination to this effect. By definition,
case-specific facts are not subject to "general acceptance" but must
be determined on a case-by-case basis.
The basic point, then, is that whenever an expert's chain of rea-
soning includes general propositions that cut across cases and that
20 Of course, the mere fact that a witness can be cross-examined is not a reason to
admit the testimony. But, if the evaluation of cross-examination (or conflicting
testimony) would require the jury to evaluate the soundness of the science that the
witness relies on-a task that the jury is not well suited to undertake-then there is a
reason for heightened scrutiny.
21 Professor Edward J. Imwinkelried has argued convincingly that this dichotomy
has illuminated the distinction between the aspects of an expert's testimony that are
subject to Federal Rule 702 and those that are governed by Federal Rule 703. See
Edward J. Imwinkelried, The "Bases" of Expert Testimony: The Syllogistic Structure
of Scientific Testimony, 67 N.C. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1989) [hereinafter Imwinkelried, The
"Bases" of Expert Testimony]; Edward J. lmwinkelried, The Educational Significance
of the Syllogistic Structure of Expert Testimony, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1148, 1149-52
(1993) [hereinafter Imwinkelried, Educational Significance].
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are purportedly scientific, these claims-and only these claims-
should be subject to special scrutiny. The crucial distinction, in
other words, is between the case-specific facts asserted in minor
premises and the trans-case facts asserted in major premises."2 The
former are "adjudicative facts," while the latter are "legislative
facts." '213 Screening for general acceptance prevents the jury from
relying on a legislative fact-the validity of a scientific theory-
when the fact is not generally accepted in the relevant community
of experts.
Daubert works no change in the principle, clearly established
under Frye, that the heightened scrutiny pertains strictly to meth-
odology. 4 Instead, Daubert simply substitutes for the pure general-
212 Cf. Imwinkelried, The "Bases" of Expert Testimony, supra note 211 (same);
Edward J. Imwinkelried, Developing a Coherent Theory of the Structure of Federal
Rule of Evidence 703, 47 Mercer L. Rev. 447, 476, 478 (1996) (arguing that this
distinction is important in defining the scope of Federal Rule 703); Imwinkelried,
Educational Significance, supra note 211 (same); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The
Meaning of "Facts or Data" in Federal Rule of Evidence 703: The Significance of the
Supreme Court's Decision to Rely on Federal Rule 702 in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharms., Inc., 54 Md. L. Rev. 352,358-59 (1995) (same).
213 The terminology was coined by Professor Kenneth Davis. 2 Kenneth Culp Davis,
Administrative Law Treatise § 15.03, at 353 (1958) (defining "adjudicative facts" as
those "concerning the immediate parties - who did what, where, when, how, and
with what motive or intent"); Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of
Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 364, 402, 408-09 (1942)
(defining "legislative facts" as those involved "[w]hen an agency wrestles with a
question of law or policy.., the [more general] facts which inform its legislative
judgment"). Professors John Monahan and Laurens Walker have built on this basic
distinction in considering ways to inform factflnders of relevant social science
knowledge. John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining,
Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 477 (1986).
214 In an early case on the admissibility of DNA testing, the trial court in People v.
Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 995 (Sup. Ct. 1989), grafted a "third prong" on to the
normal requirements that the underlying theory and method of reaching expert
conclusions be generally accepted. This court insisted on "a pre-trial hearing to
determine if the testing laboratory performed the accepted scientific techniques in
analyzing the forensic samples in this particular case." Id. Routinely treating the
application of a generally accepted theory and methodology as an aspect of
admissibility represents a novel extension of Frye. The Castro court justified this
additional "prong" on the theory that:
Given the complexity of the DNA multi-system identification tests and the
powerful impact that they may have on a jury, passing muster under Frye alone
is insufficient to place this type of evidence before a jury without a preliminary,




acceptance test a richer set of criteria with which to scrutinize
methodology. Under both Daubert and Frye, "[t]he focus, of
course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the
conclusions that they generate."2 '5
In Daubert itself, this focus became quite blurred. The excluded
testimony was the experts' opinion that Bendectin was a human
teratogen. Was the underlying "methodology" the unpublished re-
analysis of data from a published epidemiological study, as the
Ninth Circuit had thought? Was it the undisclosed statistical pro-
cedure used in this reanalysis to discern a statistically significant
association between exposure to Bendectin and limb reduction de-
fects? Was it inferring teratogenicity in humans in the absence of
consistent and statistically significant epidemiological findings? Or,
is it possible that the experts' opinion was itself a "methodology"
that required a preliminary showing of soundness? The Supreme
Court's discussion of scientific soundness was so abstract and un-
connected to the evidence in the case that its opinion provides no
answer. On remand, the Ninth Circuit also gave no answer, and it
refused to let the district court venture into this thicket. Rather, it
upheld the summary judgment on the ground that even if general
causation could be proved, the admissible evidence could not sup-
port a conclusion that the plaintiffs' injuries were attributable to
the drug.
216
The analysis offered above provides some answers to this in-
quiry. In Frye, the case-specific conclusion was that the defendant
was telling the truth when he denied being the murderer (C). In
Id. at 987. Some courts accepted this innovation. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez,
3 F.3d 1191, 1197-98 (8th Cir. 1993); Ex parte Perry, 586 So. 2d 242, 248-50 (Ala.
1991). Most Frye jurisdictions are satisfied with pretrial hearings on general
acceptance alone. See, e.g., State v. Vandebogart, 616 A.2d 483, 495 (N.H. 1992);
State v. Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502,507 & n.4 (Wash. 1993).
215 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595.
216 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1320-21 (9th Cir. 1995)
(emphasis and citations omitted). The court reasoned that:
California tort law requires plaintiffs to show not merely that Bendectin
increased the likelihood of injury, but that it more likely than not caused their
injuries .... In terms of statistical proof, this means that plaintiffs must
establish not just that their mothers' ingestion of Bendectin increased somewhat
the likelihood of birth defects, but that it more than doubled it-only then can
it be said that Bendectin is more likely than not the source of their injury.
Id. Here, however, "[n]one of plaintiffs' epidemiological experts claims that ingestion
of Bendectin during pregnancy more than doubles the risk of birth defects." Id.
1976 [Vol. 87:1933
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Daubert, the analogous case-specific conclusion is that Bendectin
caused plaintiffs' injuries (C). These are adjudicative facts in the
two cases. The methodology-conclusion distinction focuses atten-
tion at the stage of admissibility on the legislative facts-the
scientifically established, trans-case premises used in reaching the
case-specific conclusions. In Daubert, these premises include the
proposition that Bendectin is a teratogen-that it can (and some-
times does) cause limb reduction defects (P,"). Thus, if a single
expert had been offered to prove C' (specific causation), the gate-
keeping role would have required elevated scrutiny of the
underlying scientific premise P," (general causation).
The plaintiffs divided up the reasoning from the various prem-
ises to the case-specific conclusion C' among several experts,
however. One group was willing to attest to general causation, and
a different group to specific causation. This division of expert labor
can make no difference in applying the methodology-conclusion
distinction. Daubert is simply a case in which one expert's testi-
mony ends at the methodological level of the major premise, and
another expert's testimony employs that premise to reach the case-
specific conclusion."7 It is comparable to having one expert testify
that a sudden systolic pressure spike is indicative of deception and
another report that, because he found no such spike, defendant
was not deceptive. Under Frye, the first expert's "conclusion"
about the physiological correlate of deception would have to be
generally accepted. The second expert's case-specific observations
would not have to run this gauntlet. Under Daubert, the only dif-
217 Schematically, the proof might look something like the following:
P,": Sufficient exposure in utero to Bendectin can cause injury. (Expert 1)
P2": Plaintiff received sufficient exposure. (Lay witness and Expert 2)
PR,": Plaintiff was injured. (Expert 3)
P4": Plaintiff was not exposed to anything else that could have injured him. (Expert 3)
P,": The injury did not occur spontaneously. (Expert 3)
C": Bendectin caused plaintiff's injury. (Expert 3)
Regardless of how the testifying is divided up, P," is a legislative fact to which
heightened scrutiny should be applied. P." through P," are adjudicative facts, but all of
them could (and some clearly do) rest on unstated scientific premises that warrant
scrutiny. Under Daubert, such scrutiny is required of all the scientific premises of the
argument. That the judge may find that some of the premises are only weakly
established, and that the conclusion is in grave doubt, goes to the sufficiency of the




ference is that the first expert's "conclusion" would have to be
adequately validated by reference to general acceptance and other
factors.
Recognizing that the labels "methodology" and "conclusion"
can be confusing, and lacking a well articulated standard for using
these terms, courts in recent years have shied away from them.
General Electric Co. v. Joine 8 is the most prominent example.
Robert Joiner was an electrician who worked for nearly twenty
years for a city water and light department in Georgia. His work
brought him into contact with Polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs")
in electrical transformers. In 1991, at the age of thirty-seven, he
was diagnosed with lung cancer.1 9 Joiner and his wife sued three
manufacturers of PCBs on theories of strict liability, negligence,
and fraud.' A former cigarette smoker, Joiner alleged that tobacco
smoke acted as an initiator of his cancer and that the PCBs acted as
a promotor, transforming the initiated cells into malignant
growths."' Defendants moved for summary judgment.' They ar-
gued that "plaintiffs ... cannot present credible, admissible
scientific evidence that... small cell lung cancer in humans can be
caused or promoted by PCBs,"' and they maintained that PCBs
do not cause cancer unless other chemicals-namely, furans or di-
oxins-are present. Plaintiffs' experts pointed to studies of PCBs to
dispute this claim, 4 and they suggested that there were reasons to
think that Joiner had been exposed to PCBs, furans, and dioxins.
Defendants argued further, however, that the available evidence
indicated that Joiner had no significant exposure to any of these
three types of chemicals."
The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment. It found that although there was a genuine dispute as to
2-8 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
219 Joiner v. Gen. Elec. Co., 864 F. Supp. 1310, 1312-13 (N.D. Ga. 1994), rev'd, 78
F.3d 524 (11th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
2 2 Id. at 1314.
21 Id. at 1313-14.
-The cases were initiated in state court, but defendants removed them to the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. Id. at 1314.
Id. (omissions in original) (internal quotations omitted).
24 Id. at 1322-27 (discussing studies of PCBs).
Joiner v. Gen. Elec. Co., 78 F.3d 524, 528 (11th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 522 U.S. 136
(1997).
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whether Joiner was exposed to PCBs, the potentially admissible
evidence failed to show that he was exposed to furans or dioxins."6
Furthermore, the court found that the epidemiological and animal
studies on which plaintiffs' experts relied were too weak to justify
the conclusion that PCBs can promote cancers. Finding this major
premise scientifically unsound, the district court ruled the expert
testimony that rested on it to be inadmissible.
A divided panel of the Eleventh Circuit reversed. Two judges
concluded that the district court "improperly assessed the admissi-
bility of the proffered scientific expert testimony and overlooked
evidence establishing disputed issues of fact."'' 7 In particular, the
court held that there was a disputed issue of fact as to whether
Joiner was exposed to furans and dioxins, and that the district
court erred in finding the claim that PCBs promote cancers to be
too speculative to be admissible.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the "particu-
larly stringent standard of review"' that the court of appeals
purported to apply to the district court's ruling that plaintiffs' ex-
perts' opinions were inadmissible under Daubert. The Supreme
Court unanimously agreed that the district court's ruling on admis-
sibility was reversible only for an abuse of discretion tm and all but
one Justice agreed that the district court's ruling excluding the
experts' opinions about the effects of PCBs was within its discre-
tion."l The portion of the majority opinion upholding the
226 Joiner, 864 F. Supp. at 1318-19.
221 Joiner, 78 F.3d at 528 (opinion of Judge Barkett). Judge Birch "concurfred] in this
opinion," emphasizing in his concurring opinion that the district court exceeded its
role as "gatekeeper" by examining the weight and sufficiency of the evidence. Id. at
534 (Birch, J., concurring).
I' Id. at 529.
29 This result was predictable, but it has been criticized. Compare D.H. Kaye, Joiner
and Scheffer Scientific Evidence in the Supreme Court, Newsletter (Ass'n of Am.
Law Sch. Sec. on Evidence), Fall 1997, at 2, with Michael J. Saks, The Aftermath of
Daubert: An Evolving Jurisprudence of Expert Evidence, 40 Jurimetrics J. 229, 235-
36 (2000).
'"Joiner, 522 U.S. at 152 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
2-1 The Supreme Court remanded the case so that the district court could address
what it perceived as two unresolved questions: "Whether Joiner was exposed to
furans and dioxins, and whether if there was such exposure, the opinions of Joiner's
experts would then be admissible." Id. at 147. The district court, however, already had
concluded that even "[alssuming that Plaintiffs experts had not made unfounded
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evidentiary ruling reviewed the research literature on whether
PCBs promote cancers and concluded that the district court did not
err in finding that the experts could not establish this major prem-
ise in a scientifically sound manner.'
This disposition required the Court to confront the argument
"that because the District Court's disagreement was with the con-
clusion that the experts drew from the studies, the District Court
committed legal error and was properly reversed by the Court of
Appeals."' 3 According to Justice John Paul Stevens:
The reliability ruling was more complex and arguably is not
faithful to the statement in Daubert that "[tjhe focus, of course,
must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the con-
clusions that they generate." Joiner's experts used a "weight of
the evidence" methodology to assess whether Joiner's exposure
to transformer fluids promoted his lung cancer. They did not
suggest that any one study provided adequate support for their
conclusions, but instead relied on all the studies taken together
(along with their interviews of Joiner and their review of his
medical records). The District Court, however, examined the
studies one by one and concluded that none was sufficient to
show a link between PCB's and lung cancer. The focus of the
opinion was on the separate studies and the conclusions of the
experts, not on the experts' methodology.
Unlike the District Court, the Court of Appeals expressly
decided that a "weight of the evidence" methodology was scien-
tifically acceptable.
Rather than analyze the methodology-conclusion distinction, the
majority threw up its hands:
assumptions about [exposure to] furans and dioxins .... Plaintiffs' expert testimony
would not be admissible." Joiner, 864 F. Supp. at 1322.
See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 145-47. A group of distinguished scientists had argued that
plaintiffs' experts' views on PCBs were unfounded. Their brief reviewed the
epidemiological literature and concluded that "there were no human studies showing
any causal relationship between PCBs and small-cell lung cancer. .. ." Brief of Amici
Curiae Bruce N. Ames et al. in Support of Petitioners at 20, Joiner, 78 F.3d 524 (No.
96-188). These amici also insisted that "[t]he mice studies... did not fit the facts of
this case." Id. at 19-20. The Court's opinion reiterated these conclusions.
Z'Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146.
Id. at 152-53 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations
omitted).
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Respondent points to Daubert's language that the "focus, of
course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not on
the conclusions that they generate."... But conclusions and
methodology are not entirely distinct from one another.
Trained experts commonly extrapolate from existing data. But
nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence re-
quires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is
connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A
court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical
gap between the data and the opinion proffered.s
This abandonment of the focus on methodology prompted Jus-
tice Stevens to retort:
Daubert quite clearly forbids trial judges to assess the validity
or strength of an expert's scientific conclusions, which is a mat-
ter for the jury. Because I am persuaded that the difference
between methodology and conclusions is just as categorical as
the distinction between means and ends, I do not think the
statement that "conclusions and methodology are not entirely
distinct from one another," either is accurate or helps us answer
the difficult admissibility question presented by this record.23
As Justice Stevens maintained, the distinction between method-
ology and conclusion is viable,' but the classification serves legal
rather than scientific purposes and must be applied accordingly.
The words function to avoid excessive scrutiny of case-specific, mi-
nor premises and case-specific conclusions. The trans-case, major
premise that PCBs promote cancers in human beings should be
shown to be sufficiently well-established by the methods of science
to justify its use in an expert chain of reasoning.' The majority's
2-11 Id. at 146 (citation omitted).
21 Id. at 154-55 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations
omitted).
z" See Saks, supra note 229, at 235-36.
2-1 Consequently, both the majority and the dissent in Joiner are correct. The
dissenting opinion is correct to criticize the majority for eliding the fundamental
distinction, but it is wrong to treat "weight of evidence" as a valid "methodology" that
scientists employ (when they write review papers or develop risk assessments). Joiner,
522 U.S. at 152-53 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Validity at
so abstract a level is not enough to ensure that the putative scientific theories that
reach juries are sufficiently scientifically sound to justify a jury's reliance on testimony
about them (or derived from them). The majority is correct to demand more than the
ipse dixit of an expert that the literature supports the major premise, but wrong to
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demand that the expert not leap to a conclusion about the carcino-
genicity of PCBs 9 is consistent with this specificity analysis.
Following Joiner, however, the Supreme Court has continued to
blur the methodology-conclusion distinction. In Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, the Court observed that "[t]he objective of [Daubert]
is to ... make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony
upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the
courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the
practice of an expert in the relevant field."2" Various lower federal
courts had drawn the same lesson from Daubert, and several have
spoken of a departure from the level of professional care normally
observed outside of litigation as a reason to exclude statistical tes-
timony."4 Because the Kumho opinion deals with all stripes of
experts, including those who rely on skill that is not reducible to
any articulated methodology, the search for some substitute for the
"scientific methodology" standard sketched in Daubert2 is under-
standable and important.
Kumho's quasi-malpractice standard is useful in this connection,
but the demand for ordinary rigor should not excuse the failure of
an entire field of putative experts to apply truly rigorous standards
in developing their field. Neither should it result in the exclusion of
expert testimony just because a judge believes that a more rigorous
analysis would have led to different conclusions. A demand for
"rigor" is easy to apply to all facets of expert testimony-
contend that this is because "conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct
from one another." Id. at 146.
239 Id. ("A court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap
between the data and the opinion proffered.").
240 Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152.
241 See, e.g., Sheehan v. Daily Racing Form, Inc., 104 F.3d 940, 942 (7th Cir. 1997)
(describing the omission of certain data and variables as "a failure to exercise the
degree of care that a statistician would use in his scientific work, outside of the
context of litigation," and citing Braun v. Lorillard Inc., 84 F.3d 230, 234 (7th Cir.
1996), Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 318 (7th Cir. 1996), and Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316-19 (9th Cir. 1995), for the proposition
that "Daubert ... requires the district judge to satisfy himself that the expert is being
as careful as he would be in his regular professional work outside his paid litigation
consulting").
242 For elaborations on the opinion's efforts to describe the process of evaluating
scientific theories, see Foster & Huber, supra note 172; Erica Beecher-Monas, A Ray
of Light for Judges Blinded by Science: Triers of Science and Intellectual Due
Process, 33 Ga. L. Rev. 1047, 1051-55 (2000).
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conclusions as well as methods. It could tempt courts to exclude le-
gitimately debatable testimony that they find unpersuasive, even
though it is based on generally accepted and valid methods. To be
sure, there will be cases in which an expert has been so sloppy in
applying these methods that the testimony would not be suffi-
ciently probative under Federal Rule 403, but the stricter scrutiny
reserved for trans-case scientific reasoning should not be applied
under the rubric of rigor to case-specific conclusions.243
In sum, the specificity standard for distinguishing methodology
from conclusion for the purpose of applying heightened scrutiny is
superior to the Joiner Court's apparent willingness to allow the
category of methodology to bleed into the category of conclusions.
It is also superior to any tendency to read into Kumho a require-
ment that case-specific conclusions be subjected to the careful
scrutiny that is properly reserved for scientific methods.
Nonetheless, the specificity standard is not always trivial to ap-
ply. In particular, problems can arise in screening statistical
evidence, which typically involves methods that are accepted at a
very general level and that are sound as applied to certain types of
data but not to others. For example, whether an expert has used an
acceptable formula for estimating the frequency of a genotype in
the population plainly is a methodological issue. It involves a trans-
case, major premise. Equally plainly, whether the same expert has
done the arithmetic correctly is a case-specific question not subject
to heightened scrutiny under Frye or Daubert. But consider State v.
Garcia,2" in which:
[A] trial court in Arizona admitted testimony about likelihood
ratios in a rape case involving two assailants.... [A]nalysis of
the semen stain on the victim's blouse indicated that sperm
from two males were present. According to the court of ap-
peals, a population geneticist "provided the jury with likelihood
ratios (broken down by population subgroups such as Cauca-
24
-The amended Federal Rule 702 requires that "the witness has applied the
principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case." Fed. R. Evid. 702(3). This
condition implements Joiner's willingness to examine an expert's conclusions as an
aspect of admissibility. If applied too strictly, it will exclude probative expert evidence
that is like almost all evidence-it has weaknesses, but jurors can appreciate this fact
and give the testimony the weight it deserves. Thus, this prong of the amended rule
should be applied in a manner that is consistent with Federal Rule 403.
24 3 P.3d 999 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999).
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sians, African Americans, and the like) for three distinct sce-
narios involving the sources of the DNA mixture found in the
stain: (1) victim, defendant and unknown versus victim and two
unknowns; (2) victim, defendant and unknown versus defen-
dant and two unknowns; and (3) victim, defendant and one
unknown versus three unknowns."245
The trial court admitted this testimony following a Frye hearing
at which the state's expert testified to general acceptance. The de-
fendant was convicted. On appeal, he argued that the state had not
proved that the specific formulas used to calculate the likelihood
ratios had been generally accepted. The court of appeals affirmed
the conviction, reasoning that both the concept of the likelihood
ratio and the specific formulas were generally accepted, as indi-
cated by publications in the scientific literature.
In a petition for review, Garcia suggested that although the use
of the likelihood ratio has support in the literature, the particular
formulas were not previously published. There is no general for-
mula, however, for computing a likelihood ratio. The formula
depends on the specific hypotheses being compared. The likeli-
hood ratio for a mixture with two possible men is different from
that for a mixture with three, or four, and so on. The same ap-
proach produces the appropriate expression in each situation, and
arriving at the correct expression is like solving word problems in
high school algebra. Everyone agrees that the problems should be
solved with formulas derived according to the rules of algebra, but
different word problems require different formulas. The use of al-
gebra is generally accepted, but a student can make a mistake
applying those rules.
In Garcia, the use of likelihood ratios is generally accepted as
scientifically valid, but an expert can make a mistake in algebrai-
cally representing the pertinent conditional probabilities or in
working out the algebra that yields the likelihood ratio for a par-
245 1 Modem Scientific Evidence, supra note 23, § 15-5.4, at 251-52 (Supp. 2000)
(quoting State v. Garcia, 305 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 7, 15 (Ct. App. 1999)). To illustrate
the nature of the testimony with simplified numbers for the first set of hypotheses, the
calculations might show that the chance of the specified DNA types being present was
100 times greater if (a) the DNA came from the victim, the defendant, and a
randomly selected person than if (b) it came from the victim and two randomly
selected persons.
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ticular problem. Is this a concern about the case-specific, minor
premise (so that Frye would not apply) or a trans-case, major
premise (that must be generally accepted)? Because the formulas
used in Garcia easily could be employed in other cases involving a
mixture of DNA from one female and two males, they fall into the
latter category. There would be little difficulty admitting them un-
der Daubert, for the derivation of the formulas is a straightforward
algebraic exercise that can be verified by any number of experts
familiar with probability theory.2" Affidavits from a few such ex-
perts should be enough to demonstrate the requisite reliability.
Under Frye, it is more difficult to introduce even an obviously valid
result that has yet to be scrutinized fully by the relevant portion of
the scientific community, but an advocate can build a record of ac-
ceptance even in this situation.24 In any event, the added difficulty
of satisfying Frye is not a reason to depart from the specificity
standard for the methodology-conclusion classification. If anything,
it is a reason to replace Frye with a more direct inquiry into scien-
tific validity.
D. Looking Back at Statistical Evidence
The prior sections reveal that until recently, statistical evidence
either was admitted as a matter of course, excluded as irrelevant
because it was obviously baseless, or questioned on extremely du-
246 Comparison could be made to a great many results in applied mathematics. For
instance, the MacLaurin series for expressing any differentiable function as an infinite
series is well known. See, e.g., The Chemical Rubber Co., Standard Mathematical
Tables 407-08 (Samuel M. Selby ed., 14th ed. 1965). The method is generally
accepted, but it produces different expressions for different functions. For example,
the function e " becomes 1 + ax + a2x212! + ax313! +..., while the function sin(bx)
becomes bx - b3x13! + bYS5 bx/7! + . ... Very similar expansions can be found in
standard references such as the CRC tables, and any mathematician can check
whether these expansions are correct.
Whether the population genetics models that give rise to some of the expressions
that enter into a likelihood ratio for DNA mixtures are sufficiently validated is a
distinct question from the accuracy of the algebra. The adequacy of these models in a
given situation is ultimately an empirical question rather than a mathematical one.
2IFor instance, in Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988),
Lifecodes Corporation had a prominent molecular biologist from MIT visit its
laboratory and testify that the DNA techniques that Lifecodes used to identify the
defendant as a rapist and burglar were generally accepted, notwithstanding the
novelty of their application to establishing human identity. Id. at 847-49.
2001] 1985
1986 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 87:1933
bious grounds. In each of these instances, the strict scrutiny stan-
dards for scientific evidence were not applied to statistical proof.
As late as 1994, it could be said that although "a particular study
may use a method that is... so poorly executed that it should be
inadmissible[,] .... [m]ore often.., the battle over statistical evi-
dence concerns weight or sufficiency rather than admissibility."2"
Indeed, the 1999 edition of McCormick on Evidence does not even
address the subtleties of applying the special standards for scien-
tific evidence to statistical analyses, for it suggests that the
admissibility of statistical assessments rarely is in doubt.4 9 With the
explosion of employment discrimination claims brought under Ti-
tle VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act in the 1970s and 1980s, and
through the efforts of economistse and statisticians in a broad
spectrum of cases, courts became exposed to-and came to ex-
pect'-more sophisticated and potentially more useful statistical
models.' To be sure, there was no shortage of argument among
experts and counsel about the persuasiveness of specific statistical
analyses.' Many courts experienced considerable difficulty pene-
m David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in
Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 333, 335 n.2 (Federal Judicial Center ed.,
1994).
249 See I McCormick on Evidence, supra note 25, § 209, at 800.
See, e.g., Arnold H. Lozowick et al., Law and Quantitative Multivariate Analysis:
An Encounter, 66 Mich. L. Rev. 1641 (1968); Rubinfeld & Steiner, supra note 18.
z E.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 53 n.20 (1986) (describing how the court
turned to the literature to assess the methods of analysis used); Coble v. Hot Springs
Sch. Dist. No. 6, 682 F.2d 721, 730-33 (8th Cir. 1982) (chiding plaintiffs for not
applying multiple regression analysis).
By 1984, a legal news reporter could observe that "[w]hat demonstrative evidence
was to the 1960s and early '70s, statistics have become to the 1980s-the hottest new
way to prove a complicated case." David Lauter, Making a Case with Statistics, Nat'l
L.J., Dec. 10, 1984, at 1.
211 See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 888 (11th Cir. 1985) ("The usefulness
of statistics obviously depends upon what is attempted to be proved by them."), aff'd,
481 U.S. 279 (1987); Chang v. Univ. of R.I., 606 F. Supp. 1161, 1206 (D.R.I. 1985)
("The studies by Siskin and Zellner reach diametrically opposed results with virtually
the same data. But, there are numerous-and important-differences in the
models."); Presseisen v. Swarthmore Coll., 442 F. Supp. 593, 619 (E.D. Pa. 1977) ("It
seems to the Court that each side has done a superior job in challenging the other's
regression analysis, but only a mediocre job in supporting their own. In essence, they
have destroyed each other and the Court is, in effect, left with nothing.").
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trating these arguments,' and some jurisdictions searched for
bright-line rules that would reveal which statistical convention or
procedure had to be used to produce a prima facie case. 5 The ad-
missibility of the studies, however, rarely was questioned. 6
This situation changed as commentators and advocates brought
concerns about "junk science" to the forefront of the judicial con-
sciousness. Although Daubert was but a variation on the theme of
earlier cases, the allusion to "gatekeeping" struck a responsive
chord,' encouraging federal district courts to be bolder in exclud-
ing scientific evidence and prompting state courts to reconsider
their rules and to look more carefully at proffers of scientific testi-
mony. Today, "Daubert motions" to exclude statistical studies or
conclusions have migrated from the realm of epidemiology in
which Daubert was grounded to many substantive fields and types
of statistical proof. To identify the special issues that arise with sta-
214 See, e.g., Wilkins v. Univ. of Houston, 654 F.2d 388, 410 (5th Cir. 1981) ("In
closing, we add a note both rueful and cautionary. The bar is reminded that sound
statistical analysis is a task both complex and arduous. Indeed, obtaining sound results
by these means, results that can withstand informed testing and sifting both as to
method and result, is a mission of comparable difficulty to arriving at a correct
diagnosis of disease."), vacated and remanded, 459 U.S. 809 (1982); Penk v. Or. State
Bd. of Higher Educ., 48 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1724, at 1849, 1862 n.13 (D. Or.
1985) (noting that aspects of the regression analysis procedure are "technical in
nature and difficult to grasp," that the results may sometimes be "invalid and
misleading," and that "the methodology of this regression was not fully
comprehensible to the court, and hence it is difficult to evaluate its results"), aff'd, 816
F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1987).
"I See, e.g., Palmer v. Shultz, 815 F.2d 84, 92-95 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that
significance at 0.05 level in two-tail test required to create prima facie case). For
criticism of the efforts to convert statistical practices to legal rules, see Mikel Aickin,
Issues and Methods in Discrimination Statistics, in Statistical Methods in
Discrimination Litigation, supra note 14, at 159; Laurens Walker & John Monahan,
Social Facts: Scientific Methodology as Legal Precedent, 76 Cal. L. Rev. 877 (1988).
26 One reason may have been the lack of jury trials in Title VII and other civil cases
that often involved multiple regressions. Excluding these studies is less critical in
bench trials.
2" Justice Blackmun introduced the metaphor of federal judges as "gatekeepers"
into the literature on scientific evidence in Daubert. See supra text accompanying
note 159. The phrase has become so ubiquitous that there now are references to the
"science" of gatekeeping. John M. Conley & David W. Peterson, The Science of
Gatekeeping: The Federal Judicial Center's New Reference Manual on Scientific
Evidence, 74 N.C. L. Rev. 1183 (1996). The phrase has no special meaning. In
applying the rules of evidence and procedure to exclude testimony, judges have been
gatekeepers both before and after the adoption of evidence codes.
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tistical expert testimony, and to illustrate how these issues should
be approached, the remainder of this paper examines a study of
damages in a major antitrust case.
II. BRINGING DAUBERT AND KUMHO TO BEAR:
CONWOOD CO. V. UNITED STATES TOBACCO CO.'
A. Conwood's Complaint: Monopolizing Moist Snuff
Snuff is a smokeless tobacco productz59 that is placed in small
amounts between the cheek and the gums. The major producer of
moist snuff is United States Tobacco Company, Inc. ("USTC"),'
followed by Conwood Company, L.P."' In 1998, Conwood filed a
complaint in the United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Kentucky alleging that USTC monopolized the moist snuff
-No. 00-6267 (6th Cir. Jan. 4, 2000). I must caution the reader that I received
compensation for work on Appellants' briefs to the court of appeals and on the
preparation for the oral argument.
219Smokeless tobacco products include loose leaf chewing tobacco, plug and twist
chewing tobacco, dry snuff, and moist snuff.
The firms that have the largest market shares in the industry are U.S. Tobacco
Company (37.9%), Conwood Company L.P. (23.2%), and Pinkerton Tobacco
Company (28.1%). These firms together accounted for 83% of total U.S.
production in the industry in 1996. Other firms in the industry include National
Tobacco Company (9.2% market share), Swisher International Group, Inc.
(6.8%), Brown & Williamson (0.5%), and R.C. Owen Company of Tennessee,
Inc. (0.4%).
Edward Knight et al., The U.S. Tobacco Industry in Domestic and World Markets,
Cong. Research Serv. Rep. No. 98-506 E, at CRS 21 (1998).
m U.S. Tobacco Company, Inc. is the holding company for United States Tobacco
Company. Through subsidiaries, USTC manufactures and markets various consumer
products and entertainment services. It is the world's leading producer of moist
smokeless tobacco, with sales of 46 million pounds in 1996 and manufacturing
facilities in Illinois, Kentucky and Tennessee. Id. USTC was created in the court-
ordered dissolution of the Duke Tobacco Trust in 1911. Its brands account for
approximately 75% of moist snuff sales in the United States. Proof Brief for
Appellees at 5-6, Conwood, (No. 00-6267) [hereinafter Appellees' Brief].
26 "Conwood Company L.P. is a limited partnership which manufactures moist and
dry snuff and loose leaf, plug and twist chewing tobacco. Estimated 1996 sales were 28
million pounds ... [with] manufacturing facilities in Kentucky, North Carolina, and
Tennessee." Knight et al., supra note 259, at CRS 210.
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market in the U.S. in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.2
Conwood's theory, as developed at a four-week trial, was that:
In 1990, UST began an orchestrated campaign to choke off the
distribution of rivals' products. Disdaining competition on the
merits-which UST feared would erode its market share and
profit margin-UST used its power to exclude competitors' dis-
play racks, advertising, and products. UST's representatives
tossed as many as 20,000 Conwood [sales] racks [in retail stores]
into dumpsters each month.'
USTC denied engaging in systematic, exclusionary conduct of
this (or any other) sort. It moved to exclude econometric testimony
designed to prove that USTC's allegedly illegal conduct gravely
suppressed Conwood's sales of its brands of snuff, and it sought
summary judgment. The district court denied these motions. At
trial, USTC cross-examined Conwood's expert and presented its
own expert who dismissed the damages study as worthless,2 64 but
produced no evidence of its own as to the amount of damages.
After deliberating for under four hours, a jury awarded Con-
wood $350 million in damages. 5 Trebling this figure, the district
court entered a judgment of $1.05 billion. 7 USTC's appeal to the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is pending.
B. Conwood's Resistance Theory
In establishing damages, Conwood relied heavily on an analysis
prepared by Dr. Richard Leftwich, a professor of accounting and
finance.6 As presented, the study appeared to be a paradigm of
26215 U.S.C. § 2 (1997). Conwood also alleged various state law causes of actions but
dropped these before the case went to the jury. Proof Brief for Appellants at 3,
Conwood, (No. 00-6267) [hereinafter Appellants' Brief].
-6.- Appellees' Brief, supra note 260, at 2.
21 See infra note 294.
M' Appellees' Brief, supra note 260, at 4.
6615 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1997) (allowing a prevailing plaintiff to "recover threefold the
damages by it sustained and the cost of suit").
217 Appellants' Brief, supra note 262, at 4.
,66Leftwich, who worked as a consultant with the firm of Lexecon, Inc., is "the Fuji
Bank-Heller Professor of Accounting and Finance in the graduate school of business"
at the University of Chicago. Leftwich Trial Transcript at 5, Conwood, (No. 00-6267)
[hereinafter Leftwich Trial Transcript]. Professor Leftwich's academic training, as
described in his curriculum vitae, is in accounting, finance, and applied economics,
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objective, scientific inquiry. It began with a "test [of] a hypothesis
about the effect of UST's behavior on Conwood's performance."'
"The hypothesis was that UST's anticompetitive behavior had a
greater impact on Conwood's market performance in cases where
Conwood had a relevantly [sic] low market share in... 1990." m
We can call this a "resistance theory." Stated more fully, this the-
ory posits that (1) USTC engaged in anticompetitive conduct to
roughly the same degree in every state; (2) the conduct had little or
no effect on Conwood's sales in states where Conwood was resis-
tant to these practices-where it had a large market share in 1990;
and (3) the conduct had a greater effect on Conwood's sales in
states where Conwood was susceptible-where it had a small mar-
ket presence in 1990.
C. Conwood's Data
To test this resistance theory, the expert compiled a table (re-
produced in the Appendix as Table Al) showing Conwood's
percentage of moist snuff sales in each state in 1990 and 1997.71 For
example, in 1990 Conwood sold 14% (by weight) of all moist snuff
in Vermont; by 1997, Conwood's share rose four percentage points
to 18%. In the District of Columbia, the share rose 10.3 points,
from 7.2% to 17.6%.m All these "raw data," as Leftwich called
themn 3 are shown in Table Al of the Appendix.
The figures in Table Al, however, are not those used in the ex-
pert's first report. The original data came from an accounting
with a Ph.D. in applied economics and finance from the University of Rochester.
Chicago GSB Faculty, Richard Leftwich, at http://gsb.uchicago.edu (last visited Oct.
1, 2001). At trial, he stated that he held "a Ph.D. in economics" and "an endowed
chair" at a school "famous for.., the economics department, the so-called Chicago
School of Economics." Leftwich Trial Transcript, supra, at 5-6.
The CEO of Conwood was allowed to opine as to the percentage of the market
"lost" to USTC and to testify that each such point was worth ten million dollars in
annual profits. Appellants' Brief, supra note 262, at 50. Yet he was not designated as
an expert under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2), and even if he had been qualified as an
expert, it is hard to imagine how the testimony could have survived a Kumho
objection.
26 Leftwich Trial Transcript, supra note 268, at 11.
270 Id. at 12.
21, The table omits data on sales in Hawaii and Alaska but includes the District of
Columbia.
2The percentages are rounded off to the nearest tenth.
- Leftwich Trial Transcript, supra note 268, at 17.
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firm's report on the pounds of moist snuff sold annually in the
various states.7 These numbers were not recorded correctly for the
initial analysis. These data-entry errors resulted in an excess of
$245 million in estimated damages. 5 Such errors are flaws in exe-
cution that should be evaluated under Federal Rule 403; they do
not affect the validity of the statistical methodology. Under
Kumho, it also could be argued that they bespeak a lack of rigor
that should preclude the expert from testifying." Data-entry errors
are common in academic research, however, and once the expert
has corrected the major errors, even if belatedly, exclusion on this
ground does not seem justified. A corrected analysis may well be
based on a valid and (ultimately) a reasonably implemented ap-
proach.
The state-by-state data can be presented more perspicaciously in
graphical form. Figure 1 is a scatter diagram that plots the 1990
market share (the horizontal distance on the X-axis) against the
subsequent growth (the height on the Y-axis). Each state thus ap-
pears as a point in the graph.
21 Id. at 47.
- Id. at 45-46.
21
6 Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently invoked such
reasoning in upholding the exclusion of a statistical analysis in a Title VII case. See
Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291,301 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Kumho to hold that plaintiffs'
statistical analysis was properly excluded as unreliable for problems ranging "from
particular miscalculations to [the expert's] general approach to the analysis,"
including tables that did not add to anywhere near 100%).
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D. Regression Analysis to Show Causation
1. The Regression Results
Leftwich then testified that he could learn little by looking at the
situation in particular states, for these results were just "anecdotes"
or "stories."' "[A]s a professional economist,"''v he was obliged to
undertake "systematic analyses" and "empirical data analysis."'
Therefore, he used "a standard economic method... called regres-
sion analysis" to test "the prediction of the original hypothesis that
Conwood's performance in low market share states should have
been.., hampered more than it was in high market share states."'
The "standard economic method" revealed that "there was a
highly reliable relationship between Conwood's growth in the pe-
-" Leftwich Trial Transcript, supra note 268, at 18.
278 Id. at 17.
2" Id. at 18.
- Id.
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riod [from 1990 to] 1997 and its market share in 1990."'2s That is,
"the results were highly reliable, or statistically significant;
in... that there was more than a 95% chance.., that these results
were, in fact, reflective of systematic patterns in the data."'r
These characterizations of statistical significance and the nature
of the relationshipr are misleading at best,' but they result from a
flawed attempt to translate technical terms into lay language" and
not necessarily from a failure to use sound statistical methods. As
such, even though they do not reflect the "intellectual rigor" with
which knowledgeable experts would be expected to present their
results outside of litigation, they have no trans-case implications.
Moreover, they can be fuel for effective impeachment. Therefore,
these errors in the presentation of the statistical analysis should not
preclude all testimony about the analysis.
The type of regression performed in Conwood is known as
"simple linear regression." The idea is to relate subsequent growth
to initial market share with a straight line through the cloud of data
points in Figure 1. The equation for a straight line that has a slope
/3 and a height a where it intersects the Y-axis is
Y= a+ X. (1)
2 l Id. at 18-19.
Id. at 20.
z' The assertion that the statistical relationship between the variables is "highly
reliable" when, as explained below, that relationship "explains" only 13% of the
variance in market share growth could have been used to impeach the witness's
understanding of the regression results or the care with which he approached the case.
The assertion went unchallenged at trial, however.
They are instances of the "transposition fallacy." See, e.g., Kaye & Freedman,
supra note 15, at 131 & n.167. The 0.95 figure is not the probability in favor of the
hypothesis that there is some association between initial market shares and
subsequent growth. Rather, if certain assumptions hold and if there is no true
association, then the probability is under 0.05 that the measured association would be
as large as it was (or larger). This significance level, as it is called, suggests that there
is some nonzero association, but neither the probability of this conclusion nor the
extent of the association can be derived from the observed significance level.
"I The use of the term "confidence" for a significance level also is problematic. See,
e.g., Aickin, supra note 255, at 170.
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The Greek letters a and P3 stand for numbers that define a straight
line,' and the regression procedure simply finds the particular
numbers that define the one line that best fits the data.
Because factors apart from Conwood's shares in 1990 affect
Conwood's market share in 1997, we would not expect the growth
within each state in the 1990-97 period to be given exactly by this
simple equation. Due to the many variables not captured in equa-
tion (1), in some states the growth will be greater, and in others it
will be less. If the effects of all the unobserved factors merely com-
bined to produce random fluctuations from the straight-line
relationship, we could just add an "error term" to the equation to
account for these disturbances. Conwood's expert therefore pos-
ited the following statistical model:
Y= a+ 3X+ e, (2)
where a is the growth expected in a state in which Conwood had
no sales in 1990 (the Y-intercept), Pl is the constant increase in
growth for a unit increase in initial market share, and e is a random
fluctuation from the values of Y expected on the basis of a and P3
alone. In other words, the error term e represents "noise" that dis-
torts the deterministic relationship of equation (1). Furthermore,
the expert assumed that the level of the noise (from all the factors
that actually determined sales but are omitted from equation (1))
was the same in every state and that it was what engineers call
"white noise.
' ' 8
- For example, when a = 0 and 13 = 1, the straight line is Y = 0 + (1 x X) = X. This is
the line that goes through the origin at an angle of forty-five degrees.
The "least-squares" regression used in Conwood treats the sum of the squared
deviations from the fitted line as the measure of "best fit."
"White noise" refers to an error term that generates errors that are described by
a "normal curve." Collectively, the assumptions of a normal distribution of
independently distributed errors with the same variance at each value of X are known
as the "normal error assumptions." See generally Rubinfeld, supra note 19, at 212-13
(describing techniques for determining the precision of regression results). The claim
that the observed level of association was statistically significant depends on these
assumptions, which Leftwich apparently never tested.
The failure to perform any regression diagnostics might well be cast as a
methodological flaw. In opposition, it could be argued that the normal error
assumptions are routine and that if they seem to be inapposite in a particular case, the
opposing party could show that by analyzing the data appropriately. Whether a jury
would follow these arguments about the presence and implications of departures from
[Vol. 87:19331994
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For the market share data of Table Al, the best estimate of the
intercept a is 0.85, and the best estimate of the slope 1P is 0.22. That
the estimated value of P3 is 0.22 means that, on average, across all
states, every additional percentage point in the share of the 1990
market is associated with an increase of about two-tenths (0.22) of
a percentage point by 1 9 97 .' If there were no association at all (P
= 0), and if other assumptions that Dr. Leftwich apparently did not
verify held, then the chance that the observed value 1P would fall as
far (or farther) from the expected value of zero as 0.22 would have
been about 0.01. The regression line Y = 0.85 + 0.22X is shown in
Figure 2, which superimposes this straight line on the scattergram.
Although the actual values show considerable dispersion about the
estimated regression line, there is a modest correlation between
Conwood's 1990 market share in a state and its subsequent share
gain in that state.'9
the normal error assumptions, however, is doubtful. The better approach is to place
the burden of performing regression diagnostics on the proponent of the regression.
Doing a regression may not be the best way to test the resistance theory. Even if
the exclusionary conduct is uniform or essentially random across states, the regression
results depend on whether resistance varies smoothly with 1990 market share. A test
that is less affected by the shape of the curve that relates resistance to 1990 market
share is a simple comparison of means. For example, one can ask whether there is any
difference in the average growth in states in which Conwood had less than 20% of the
1990 poundage than in states in which it had 20% or more. (Leftwich first used 20%
as a cut-off point in computing damages. He also used 15%.) There is, but it is too
small to be statistically significant (at the conventional 0.05 level). The same is true
for the cut-point of 15%. Letfwich's testimony that "Conwood grew more in the
foothold states, reliably more, in the foothold states than in the non-foothold states,"
Leftwich Trial Transcript, supra note 268, at 21-22, is difficult to comprehend.
The coefficient of variation, R, is just over 13%. This number describes how well
the straight line with this intercept and slope fits the data points in Figure 1. W can
range from 0.0 (for completely uncorrelated variables) to 1.0 (for perfectly correlated
variables). Here, the estimated regression line "explains" only 13% of the total
variance in market share growth among the states.








2. The Causal Inference
a. Applicability of Daubert
Even if there is a weak but real relationship between initial mar-
ket share and subsequent growth, does it prove that
"anticompetitive behavior hampered Conwood's growth more in
the non-toehold states than in the toehold states,"" as Conwood's
expert suggested? Or is the relationship, as USTC suggested on
appeal, an exercise in searching for a pattern in noisy data and
reading into that pattern something that is not there?'
1Leftwich Trial Transcript, supra note 268, at 30; see also id. at 10.
Appellants' Brief, supra note 262, at 55. Appellants argue that:
Leftwich's "low-share" theory has no foundation in economics or statistics. It
never explored or explained what economic factors could give rise to this "low
share" state pattern, but merely verified that the pattern conformed (with many
exceptions) to that perceived by self-interested observers. That such patterns
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The inference that the differences in Conwood's growth should
be attributed to USTC's illegal acts requires a leap of faith, for the
regression model contains no variable that measures these acts.
One must step outside the regression framework to draw the de-
sired conclusion, and this methodological step is difficult to justify
under Daubert. The issue here is not just whether, under the facts
of a specific case, certain assumptions in.a statistical model are rea-
sonable."3 The method in question requires the inference that
illegal conduct caused injury to a competitor simply by positing
some kind of resistance to illegal conduct that cannot be measured
directly but, by hypothesis, is reflected in some pattern in the com-
petitor's sales history after the conduct began. This logic could be
used in any antitrust case. Being a general, seemingly scientific
theory or procedure, the resistance theory should be subject to the
full scrutiny that Daubert establishes for scientific evidence.
It is difficult to see how the resistance theory can survive this
scrutiny. It has never been published or examined by other econo-
mists." As a procedure for discerning illegal conduct, the
exist is no surprise: "Almost any large data set - even pages from a table of
random digits - will contain some unusual pattern ....
Id. (citations omitted).
21" In contrast, complaints about assumptions in a model might seem like an attack
on the execution of a method rather than the validity of the method itself, but even
this is not always so. Two assumptions implicit in the regression here already have
been noted: (1) that the magnitude of exclusionary conduct in each state is the same,
and (2) that the effective resistance increases linearly with initial market share. The
failure to test these assumptions is a methodological flaw that goes to admissibility of
the testimony that reaches the case-specific conclusion that USTC's conduct
depressed Conwood's sales in the less resistant states. Nothing in economic theory or
the specific data permits one to test the assumptions. The assumptions, if false, vitiate
the inference of causation.
21 An economist hired by defendants for the litigation was critical of the damages
study. David T. Scheffman Trial Transcript at 70, Conwood (No. 00-6267) ("[H]e's
got a model that can't answer the question."); id. at 78 ("[H]e doesn't have a model
that explains anything."); id. at 79-86 (describing other variables that should have
been included in the regression model); id. at 86-87 ("[T]he data can't be used for
what he used it [sic] for, and the model can't explain what he's trying to explain."). A
courtroom crossfire between experts is not what Daubert contemplates when it speaks
of peer review and scientific theories that have withstood efforts at falsification.
A second economist, Daniel L. McFadden, who was not involved in the trial, later
reviewed the Leftwich study. Dr. McFadden is the Director of the Econometrics
Laboratory, the E. Morris Cox Professor of Economics at the University of
California, Berkeley, and the recipient of the 2000 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences.
He filed an amicus curiae brief in support of defendants-appellants. The brief states
that it is submitted to avoid a result that "trivializes the important role that properly
19972001]
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resistance method could have an enormous error rate. The method
is essentially circular. For example, an unscrupulous analyst intent
on finding causation and damages could hypothesize that Con-
wood's marketing efforts are more susceptible to USTC's conduct
in the mountain states of Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Ne-
vada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming.295 The analyst then could
"confirm" this hypothesis with a critical ratio test on the data in
Table Al, for Conwood's mean gain in market share in the moun-
tain states is one-quarter of its gain in the states outside this
mountain region.'
b. Implications of the Threat of Confounding
A further obstacle to inferring causation is the threat of con-
founding. "Confounding" refers to the action of an unobserved
variable that also is correlated with the dependent and the inde-
pendent variables.' Without data on potential confounders, it is
impossible to disentangle the effect of the measured variable from
the potentially confounding ones. In the Conwood case, it is easy to
suggest possible confounding variables. Perhaps personal income
among snuff users has grown more in states in which Conwood had
conducted economic analyses can and should play in litigated matters." Brief of
Amicus Curiae Dr. Daniel L. McFadden in Support of Defendants-Appellants at 1,
Conwood (No. 00-6267) [hereinafter McFadden's Brief]. It concludes that "Dr.
Leftwich's analysis... is fundamentally flawed," "cannot be relied upon," and "does
not meet the standard for Daubert." Id. at 23. However, appellants objected to the
court's considering the amicus brief, and the court of appeals ruled that it would not
accept this brief.
This is the designation for these states used by the Census Bureau. See, e.g.,
Census Bureau, State Population Estimates: Annual Time Series (1999), available at
http://www.census.gov.
The mean gain in Conwood's market share in mountain states is 0.9 percentage
points; in non-mountain states it is 3.7 percentage points. The difference is statistically
significant at the 0.05 level.
Kaye & Freedman, supra note 15, at 92 n.24, 138. In an age-discrimination case,
for instance, it may well be that age is correlated with lay offs-older workers are laid
off at a higher rate than younger ones. This could mean that the older workers are
laid off because they are older, or it could mean that they are laid off at a greater rate
because they are less productive. If productivity correlates with age, then it is
impossible to tell simply from the correlation between age and lay offs whether the
workers are being laid off because they are old or because they are less productive.
See, e.g., Sheehan v. Daily Racing Form, Inc., 104 F.3d 940, 942 (7th Cir. 1997)
(referring to "the more than remote possibility that age was correlated with a
legitimate job-related qualification, such as familiarity with computers" in a job that
required computer skills).
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small shares in 1990, and USTC's brands appeal more to relatively
affluent users. Population migration across state lines might be at
work. Regional differences in consumer attitudes might lead to
more growth in states in some regions than in others. Advertising
restrictions and the conduct of other competitors also vary across
states.
The well-known fact that correlation is not causation,298 however,
is not itself a reason to exclude an observational study offered to
prove causation."' The validity of an inference of causation de-
pends on how well the study succeeds in "controlling" for plausible
confounders, and the extent to which its conclusions have been
replicated in other populations.' The most effective procedure for
controlling for lurking variables is a randomized, controlled ex-
periment."' Of course, that is not possible in most econometric
research, and it was not possible in Conwood. With adequate data,
however, a statistical analyst can determine whether another vari-
able might account for the pattern. The analyst could "control" for
income, for instance, by examining whether Conwood's share
growth in those states where snuff users experienced similar in-
come growth was related to Conwood's initial market share.
Another approach would be to modify equation (2) by adding a
variable for personal income growth among snuff users. If we call
-,See, e.g., Glastetter v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., No. 00-3087, 00-3467, 2001 WL
630651, at *3 (8th Cir. 2001) ("Though case reports demonstrate a temporal
association between Parlodel and stroke, or stroke-precursors, that association is not
scientifically valid proof of causation."); Tagatz v. Marquette Univ., 861 F.2d 1040,
1044 (7th Cir. 1988) (observing that although the statistical analysis indicates a
correlation and shows that discrimination may be a possible cause, the statistics do
not exclude other possible explanations).
9 But see Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 301 (5th Cir. 2000) (suggesting that under
Kumho, it was proper to exclude plaintiffs' expert's statistical study in part because
the expert "stated that discrimination was the 'cause' of the disparities he had
observed, a statement which he later recanted as 'overzealous' since statistics can
show only correlation and not causation").
See generally Kaye & Freedman, supra note 15, at 96 (discussing the application
of a study's findings to population groups not involved in the study); Zeisel & Kaye,
supra note 16, at 27-43 (discussing the inference of causation from observational
data).
I'll Oddly, both professors described regression as a kind of experiment. See
Leftwich Trial Transcript, supra note 268, at 19 (describing an agricultural experiment
to test the effect of fertilizer on crop yield); McFadden's Brief, supra note 294, at 10,
23 (describing regression as a "scientific experiment").
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this variable Z and use the Greek letter gamma (y) to denote the
change in market share (Y) associated with a unit change in Z (for
a fixed value of the starting market share, X), then equation (2)
becomes
Y= a+ fX +yZ + e. (3)
If Z is correlated with X, then the estimated value of /3 should de-
cline (relative to equation (2)), making it harder to attribute a
change in market share growth (Y) to a unit change in initial mar-
ket share (X).
Conwood's expert examined some possibly confounding vari-
ables with a multiple regression model similar to equation (3). He
did not report whether they were correlated with 1990 market
share (X), but stated that "I tested all of the plausible explanations
that I had data that enabled me to test"' and that "[m]y tests
showed that plausible alternative explanations were inconsistent
with the patterns I found in the data."' 3 If the expert actually em-
ployed reasonable procedures to eliminate all plausible rival
hypotheses, then the resistance-regression procedure should not be
inadmissible simply because the initial regression left open the pos-
sibility of confounding variables.
c. Resistance Versus Momentum
One "plausible explanation" that the expert purported to elimi-
nate was not a confounding variable, but rather went to the core of
the resistance theory. Instead of attributing the change in market
share to the hypothetical "resistance" to USTC's conduct in some
states but not others, one might well suppose that there would be
more growth, on average, in states where Conwood was better es-
tablished, if only because its products, for any number of reasons,
were selling better in those states than in others. In other words,
the regression depicts the effects of "momentum" as readily as "re-
sistance."
Conwood's expert purported to refute the momentum interpre-
tation of the regression of 1990-97 growth on 1990 shares by means
Leftwich Trial Transcript, supra note 268, at 22.
Id. at 30.
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of a regression of 1984-90 growth on 1984 shares.' This regression
did not reveal any statistically significant association. Having al-
ready found a statistically significant association in the post-1990
period, he concluded that the only thing that could explain the
change from "not significant" before 1990 to "significant" after
1990 was differential resistance to illegal conduct.
This reasoning is fallacious. The momentum theory asserts that
with or without resistance, initial market share (X) tends to predict
subsequent market growth (Y). A large change in the predictive
value of the initial market share, as between the earlier and later
periods, would undercut the theory that only momentum is at work
in both periods (as opposed to momentum alone in the earlier pe-
riod and momentum plus resistance to illegal conduct in the later
period). At first glance, it looks like the change in the impact of ini-
tial market share in the pre-1990 period to the impact in the post-
1990 period is substantial. The pre-1990 estimate of the slope is
-0.13, but the post-1990 estimate is 0.22. Both these numbers,
however, are estimates of the unknown slope /3 in equation (2).
The true value of /3 in the pre-1990 period could be higher, and the
true value in the post-1990 period could be lower. Before conclud-
ing that the difference in the two periods should be attributed to
resistance to illegal conduct after 1990, the hypothesis that /3 is ac-
tually the same in both periods (and the observed difference is
attributable to chance) must be rejected." Yet, Conwood's expert
never tested this hypothesis. Had he done so, he would have found
that the uncertainty in the difference in the estimated slopes for
each period is too large to permit the conclusion that the difference
is statistically significant. '
Id. at 27.
, McFadden's Brief, supra note 294, at 13 ("The mere fact that the two coefficients
are different, or that one is statistically significant while the other is not, does not
constitute an appropriate statistical test of the hypothesis that the
relationship ... changed....").
- The difference between the estimated slopes in the two periods is
-0.13 - 0.22 = -0.35.
The standard error of this difference is
40.1812 + 0.083' = 0.199.




Although the point may seem a fine one, the failure of Con-
wood's expert to test for the significance of the difference in the
estimates of the slope is a methodological flaw that affects the va-
lidity of his effort to refute the momentum theory. To make the
same point with other language from Daubert, one can observe
that the use of two separate tests for significance, rather than a sin-
gle test of the difference between the two estimates, does not "fit"
the problem of eliminating the rival momentum theory as an ex-
planation for the pattern in the 1990-97 period.
E. Regression Analysis to Estimate Damages
1. Estimating Effect with a "Regression Rectangle"
If the resistance-regression proof of causation is vulnerable to
assault under Daubert, the use of the regression analysis to esti-
mate damages is open to mayhem. Conwood's expert treated
USTC as the cause-indeed, the sole cause-of Conwood's lower
growth in most states. As explained in the preceding section, he
purported to verify this treatment by a statistical regression model
that assumed that the market share in 1997 is equal to one constant
plus a second constant multiplied by the market share that Con-
wood had in 1990.' This regression did not take into account any
variables to show the effect of USTC's alleged anticompetitive
practices. It did not adequately consider whether the pattern or
trend in market share growth changed before and after the time
that the practices that were supposed to have depressed Con-
wood's growth were instituted.
For forty-nine data points, a difference of ±1.75 standard errors (or more) has a
probability of about 0.09 of occurring when P is the same in both periods. Because this
p-value exceeds 0.05, the difference in the estimated slopes is not statistically
significant at the conventional 0.05 level that Conwood's expert used elsewhere in his
testimony.
30 Leftwich regressed gain in market share from 1990 to 1997 on 1990 share:
S . - S . = a + bS,.
Adding S19, to each side of the equation gives
SM = a + (b + I)$S .
In other words, examining the correlation between 1990 shares and 1990-97 gains is
essentially the same as examining the correlation between 1990 shares and 1997
shares.
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In computing damages, the expert inexplicably modified the ac-
tual market shares in a way that was supposed to account for the
extent of USTC's "bad acts."' As in the causation analysis, the
1990-97 growth (as adjusted) was regressed on 1990 shares, yield-
ing the straight line Y = 1.8 + 0.31X, which is plotted in Figure 3.
Thus far, there has been no analysis of damages-just another
regression showing a weak correlation between two variables. To
arrive at a figure for damages, Conwood's expert divided the forty-
nine states into two groups. The high-share, supposedly resistant
group consisted of three states in which Conwood had more than
20% of the market in 1990. Although the law allows substantial
latitude in estimating damages once liability has been established,
the expert had no economic theory or data that indicated why he
selected this cut-off point. Nevertheless, he assumed that these
states were unaffected by USTC's anticompetitive practices and
hence had no damages.
The low-share, susceptible group consisted of the other forty-six
states. Leftwich assumed that had there been no anticompetitive
practices, the 1997 Conwood market share in every one of these
forty-six low-share states would have gone up from 1990 by the
same amount. But he did not use the actual experience of the high-
share states in the 20+% range to deduce this amount.' Instead, he
used the regression of 1997 on 1990 shares to predict that if Con-
wood started with 20% of a state's market in 1990, it would have
28.1% of the market in 1997. If Conwood's share in a low share
state had gone up less than 8.1 percentage points, he boosted its
Leftwich did not collect data on or analyze the incidence of alleged "bad acts."
However, USTC's economist did, and he performed a regression with individual
stores as the unit of analysis that showed no effect. Leftwich used these data on "bad
acts" assembled by USTC to modify the annual state market shares used in his
regression study. Leftwich Trial Transcript, supra note 268, at 34. Plaintiffs' Exhibit
No. 327.1 is a scatter diagram showing adjusted shares. Table A2 of the Appendix
gives corresponding numbers. The use of these adjusted figures is inconsistent with
the theory behind using "resistance" as an indicator of illegal conduct. The underlying
theory is that differences between share growth in states with high and low resistance
to USTC's conduct reflect that conduct. But if the effect of the conduct already is
reflected in the market shares, then "resistance" cannot serve as an indirect indication
of the suppression of market share resulting from USTC's conduct.
' Had he done so, he would have had to report that Conwood's average growth
in those 3 states was 5.5 percentage points, which is not statistically significantly
different from the average gain of 3.0 percentage points in the 46 low-share states.
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gain to 8.1; if Conwood's share had gone up more than 8.1 percent-
age points, he reduced the gain to 8.1 points. Thus, he gave every
one of the low-share states a market gain of 8.1 points-an amount
that exceeded Conwood's actual performance in two of the three








Estimate of How Much More of the Market it Would
1990 market share
Figure 3 is a picture of this augmentation of market shares. The
points in the rectangle are states in which Conwood supposedly
would have gained more market share in the absence of USTC's
acts. The lengths of the vertical lines drawn from these points up to
the horizontal line Y = 8.1 are the increases in market share growth
that Conwood's expert awarded Conwood in these states. The
points above the rectangle are the states in which Conwood out-
performed the gain expected of a state in which Conwood had 20%
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of the market in 1990. The lengths of vertical lines drawn from
these points down to the horizontal line Y = 8.1 are the decreases
in market share growth given to these states. The net adjustment is
the difference between the sum of the lengths of the first set of
lines (in the rectangle) and the sum of those in the second set
(above the rectangle). This difference translated into $488 million
dollars of estimated damages.10
Figure 4.
Conwood's Estimate of the Market Shares It Would Have Gained
Without "Bad Acts" by USTC
Gain to
1997
.0 g .. 9 0 0 S Se
4 L .. 1. I. , .
1990 market share
-10 Leftwich Trial Transcript, supra note 268, at 42. Leftwich performed a similar
analysis using 15% as the cutoff for high-share states. The height of the rectangle then
is only 6.5 (because the height of the regression line at X = 15 is only 6.5), and the
width of the rectangle is only 15 (leaving 13 states in the resistant group that, ex
hypothesi, suffered no damages). Based on this schema, Leftwich produced $313
million as the lower bound for damages. Both the upper and the lower estimates
ignore the statistical uncertainty in the predicted share values at the cut points of 15%
and 20%; they also ignore possible errors in the data.
200520011
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The expert's picture of what Conwood's growth would have
looked like in the absence of the "bad acts" from 1990-97 is shown
in Figure 4. The forty-six states in or above the rectangle now have
the same share gain of 8.1.1'
2. Applying Daubert to the "Regression Rectangle"
Skepticism of expert testimony is one thing; exclusion of that tes-
timony is another. To apply the validity requirement of Daubert to
this procedure for estimating damages, a court must ask whether
the methodology is sound. Conwood argued to the district court
that "regression analysis and other such economic models are ac-
cepted and tested methods for proving damages," '312 and the district
court was satisfied with this rejoinder. In a brief opinion that re-
cited the sources of the data and the fact that Conwood's expert
applied various regressions to establish his resistance theory, the
district court concluded that "Leftwich's testimony satisfies
Daubert. His methodologies are generally acceptable. Defendant's
expert also used them.... The credibility of the expert and his
opinions is an issue for the jury."
313
By "methodologies," the court apparently meant the statistical
procedure of regression. The court relied exclusively on another
district court opinion, Ohio v. Louis Trauth Dairy, Inc., 3" a price-
fixing case that it characterized as holding that Daubert was satis-
fied because "the experts[] all... were economists or statisticians
[who] conducted econometric and regression analyses that were
testable, generally acceptable, and reproducible.""3 5 As I explain
31 Because the positions of many states on the line Y = 8.1 overlap, fewer than 49
points are visible in the figure.
31Plaintiffs' Opposition to Motion to Exclude the Damages Study and Future
Testimony of Dr. Richard Leftwich at 22, Conwood Co. v. United States Tobacco Co.
(W.D. Ky. Dec. 9, 1999) (Civil Action No. 5:98CV-108-R).
31' Memorandum Opinion and Order at 4, Conwood Co. v. United States Tobacco
Co. (W.D. Ky. Feb. 23, 2000) (Civil Action No. 5:98CV-108-R) (citation omitted)
[hereinafter Memorandum and Opinion Order].
31 925 F. Supp. 1247 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
315 Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 313, at 4. The Trauth Dairy court
stated: "Econometric and regression analyses are generally considered reliable
disciplines. Furthermore, defense expert Dr. Myslinski conceded that Dr. McClave's
regression analysis is testable, generally accepted and reproducible. Regression and
statistical analysis have been admitted in antitrust cases to prove injury and to
determine damages." Trauth Dairy, 925 F. Supp. at 1252 (citations omitted).
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below, however, this analysis of the regressions in Conwood is far
too cursory.
a. Daubert's Four Factors
The problem with the district court's conclusion and reasoning is
that the analyst did more than use linear regression to predict the
value of a dependent variable. Regression is an apodictically valid
tool for measuring how changes in one variable are associated with
changes in other variables. The mathematics that generates a re-
gression equation is sound, but whether a "regression rectangle"
validly estimates damages involves additional considerations. The
most important of these considerations is the underlying premise
that resistance to anticompetitive conduct is linearly correlated
with market share and is the explanation for the positive slope of
the regression line. That theory is difficult to square with the kinds
of factors listed in Daubert.16 First, the resistance theory holds that
the effects of anticompetitive conduct can be measured simply by
identifying states in which market share grew less and attributing
the entire difference to the challenged conduct. This theory ap-
pears to have been invented for use in the Conwood case and has
never been tested-in that case or any other. This fact counts heav-
ily against admissibility.3"" Second, "the theory or technique has
[not] been subjected to peer review and publication.""3 8 The eco-
nomic literature is devoid of any discussion of the resistance theory
and the "regression rectangle" as a means of detecting and measur-
ing harms from anticompetitive conduct. Third, because the theory
and method have yet to be tested, the risks and magnitude of the
errors that it yields are unknown. Finally, as indicated by the lack
of published or other critical discourse about the approach, general
acceptance in the scientific community is lacking. The record in
"3
6 See supra Section II.D.2.a.
37 As the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit pointedly observed on remand in
Daubert, "[olne very significant fact to be considered is whether the experts are
proposing to testify about matters growing naturally and directly out of research they
have conducted independent of the litigation, or whether they have developed their
opinions expressly for purposes of testifying." Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.,
43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995). Plainly, Leftwich devised the susceptibility theory
and arrived at his opinion about it "expressly for purposes of testifying."
I'l See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
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Conwood contains no evidence that economists, statisticians, ac-
countants, or finance professors accept the resistance theory and
"regression rectangle" estimates of damages. The procedure bears
no resemblance to the commonly accepted "before-and-after" and
"yardstick" approaches that use meaningful control groups to
separate the effects of anticompetitive conduct from other fac-
tors.319
In short, to argue that the regression study in Conwood satisfies
Daubert simply because it uses least-squares regression is tanta-
mount to claiming that Ptolemy's theory that the sun revolves
around the earth is valid and generally accepted because these
movements can be described by geometry. A meaningful applica-
tion of Daubert requires verification of all the major premises of
the analytical method, not just those at the highest level of abstrac-
tion.' It is therefore appropriate to observe that no other expert in
any antitrust case has used "rectangular regression" to infer causa-
tion or to estimate damages.
A narrower but still severe methodological flaw in the Conwood
regression analysis is the use of "adjusted" market shares.32' Using
shares that were already adjusted to reflect the effect of illegal
conduct to deduce the effect of that same conduct is extremely
puzzling. Indeed, the resulting numbers are so lacking in probative
value as to be excludable under the balancing test of Federal Rule
403. Unadjusted shares produce much lower damage estimates-
$155-238 million3" instead of $313-488 million. 3 It therefore seems
that the prejudicial effect of adjustment in this case substantially
outweighs whatever minimal probative value the adjustment could
have.
Yet another disturbing feature of the analysis is the use of the
difference of 8.1 percentage points between the predicted share of
28.1% in 1997 and the arbitrary 1990 starting share of 20%. The
3"These procedures compare the outcomes in situations where the conduct of
interest is present to those in which it is absent. See, e.g., In re Indus. Silicon Antitrust
Litig., No. 95-2104, 1998 WL 1031507, at *2-3 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 1998) (concluding
that a "before-and after" regression satisfies Daubert and Bazemore v. Friday, 478
U.S. 385 (1986)).
See supra Section II.D.2.
121 See supra note 308.
31 Leftwich Trial Transcript, supra note 268, at 42.
- See supra Section II.E.1.
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share growth also can be expressed as the ratio of 28.1 to 20, or
1.405. Since this is the growth factor in a putatively resistant state,
why not assume that, but for the allegedly unlawful acts, the low-
share, susceptible states would have grown by the same factor of
1.405? This multiplicative adjustment would raise an initial 1%
share to only 1.4% instead of 8.1%.
The assumption of additive growth implicit in the regression-
rectangle damages estimate is a general feature of the method
rather than a case-specific fact. Consequently, it is appropriate to
apply Daubert and to demand a showing that the assumption is
valid. In Conwood, no theoretical or empirical reason was offered
to explain why growth would be additive rather than multiplica-
tive."' Even if the resistance theory were better established, the
-, Whether to use absolute disparities in market shares or growth rates is not a
question of statistical theory. It is a question of economics-of how sales grow over
time. The ideal way to estimate losses due to illegal conduct would be with a model
that includes those variables that determine sales and prices. With such a model, one
would set those variables to the levels that capture the relevant economic conditions
in the affected market (with the illegal conduct removed). Market share would not be
the dependent variable, and the question of whether to use the difference in share
points or the percentage growth in share points would not arise.
Even without a meaningful economic model, one can examine trends. Suppose
there are annual data on sales before and during the period of illegal conduct. If the
pre-violation data are extensive enough, we might be able to discern the relationship
between sales in one year and sales in the next. For example, sales might follow a
straight line as a function of time:
Q = At, (la)
where A is the slope of the line and t is the year (1, 2, 3.... ). In this case, the sales in
any given year t are just the constant A added to the sales of the preceding year:
Q.. = Q, + A. (1b)
We would estimate A from the trend in the pre-violation period, then add it to the
sales immediately before the violation period to estimate what sales would have been
but for the violation in the first year of the violation period.
Using relative change (the ratio rather than the difference) would be a mistake in
this situation. The percentage change in any year t is 100(Q, - Q _,)/Q, = 100AIAt =
100/t. In year t=10, for instance, sales grow by 10%. In year 20, the growth is only 5%
of the previous year's sales. Yet, the annual growth but for the illegal conduct is A,
which does not change.
On the other hand, the data on sales in the pre-violation period might establish a
different trend. Suppose sales grow by a fixed fraction B every year in this period:
Q, = Q + BQ = (B+1)Q,. (2a)
This is an exponential growth pattern:
Q = Q,(1 + B)'. (2b)
2001] 2009
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additive method of adjustment has not been validated, and it could
be quite unreliable.
b. Daubert's Fit and Joiner's Nexus
Reliance on mathematics or statistics is not enough to satisfy
Daubert. If such reliance were sufficient, then the plaintiffs' experts
in both Daubert and Joiner would have been allowed to testify
without further ado, for the experts in both these cases relied on
statistical studies or analyses. In Conwood, the use of regression to
estimate damages can be dismissed because it does not fit the prob-
lem,3' but the "fit" analysis adds nothing to the analysis of the
validity of "rectangular regression" as a method for estimating
damages.3' It is merely another way to say that although regression
is a valid procedure for looking at the association between vari-
ables and for predicting the value of a dependent variable, the
interpretation of differences in market share growth as the result of
"resistance" to illegal conduct has no logical or scientific basis.
In Joiner, the Court wrote that heightened scrutiny encompasses
not only the abstract methodology, but also the use of that meth-
odology to reach specific conclusions. As discussed in Section
II.C.2, in examining an expert's opinion based on standard statisti-
cal methods in epidemiology, the Court held that the opinion failed
to satisfy Daubert because it was "connected to existing data only
by the ipse dixit of the expert."' ' In the end, there was "simply too
In this situation, estimating changes in sales by the relative growth in the preceding
year would be correct. The sales should grow every year by 100B%.
The lesson from these examples is that there is no general rule as to which measure
of change to use. It depends on the mechanism that produces the changes. Leftwich
did not have a known trend line to use. He did not try to discern the pre-violation
pattern. Rather, he used the equivalent of four points: (1) 1990 shares and (2) 1997
shares in the supposedly resistant, high-share states, and (3) 1990 and (4) 1997 shares
in the susceptible, low-share states. Without further information, there is no way to
say whether the more accurate estimate would come from projecting the simple
difference in percentage points (as Leftwich did) or relative (percentage) growth.
2 Cf. McFadden's Brief, supra note 294, at 9 ("[Tit estimate the economic damages
resulting from those [unlawful] acts, it is necessary to identify and quantify the prices
and quantities that the plaintiff would have experienced but for the defendant's
actions, and compare these hypothetical benchmark prices and quantities with the
actual or as is prices and quantities.").
32
6 This reflects the fact that "fit" is part of the definition of validity. See supra text
accompanying note 153.
-7 Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146.
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great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion prof-
fered."'3 The phrase "ipse dixit of the expert," much like the
"gatekeeping" metaphor of Daubert itself, has great rhetorical
force, but little analytical precision. Here, it is easy to dismiss the
"rectangular regression" as an ipse dixit that cannot bridge the
"gap between the data and the opinion proffered," but the justifi-
cation for these characterizations lies entirely in the preceding
analysis of the putative validity of this novel procedure for estimat-
ing damages.
3. "Internal" Criticisms of the Regression
The major criticisms of the regression study in Conwood are
"external" to the study. The problems with the "resistance theory"
and the "rectangular regression" are present whether the regres-
sions are performed impeccably or erroneously. These problems
undermine the major premise that "resistance" can be presumed to
be the explanation for variations in market share growth. Such ex-
ternal criticisms clearly affect the validity of this regression-based
method for establishing damages. 9
- Id.
-This conclusion does not turn on the internal-external distinction, which can be
slippery. The objection that the resistance theory is invalid can be reformulated as a
complaint that the regression ignores important variables. The choice of variables in a
regression equation and the selection of a functional form (linear or nonlinear)
sounds like an internal criticism because it bears on the execution of the particular
regression. See supra note 78. However, attempting to infer causation and to measure
the impact of a variable when this variable is not included in the regression (either
directly or in the form of some adequate proxy) is a fundamental methodological
flaw. It is a procedure that cuts across cases and that lacks validity (or, equivalently,
"fit").
More typical disputes over the failure to include possibly confounding variables
should affect admissibility under Federal Rule 403 rather than Federal Rule 702. In
extreme cases, exclusion will be warranted. See, e.g., People Who Care v. Rockford
Bd. of Educ., 111 F.3d 528, 537-38 (7th Cir. 1997) (determining that a study of an
achievement gap among students of different races was inadmissible under Daubert);
cf. Smith v. Va. Commonwealth Univ., 84 F.3d 672, 677 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc)
(holding that omission of major variables precludes summary judgment); D.H. Kaye,
Statistical Evidence: How to Avoid the 'Diderot Effect' of Getting Stumped, Inside
Litig., Apr. 1988, at 21 (proposing a standard for determining when an omitted




Other criticisms are internal to the study, and the propriety of
judging admissibility under Daubert's heightened scrutiny for reli-
ability is more debatable. For instance, the data set contains
"outliers"-states that unduly influence the regression results.'l
The amicus brief hammers hard at this point:
The difference between a finding by Dr. Leftwich of several
hundred million dollars of damages and a finding of no dam-
ages is the inclusion in his model of a single anomalous data
point, the data for Washington, DC ("DC").
Any reasonable statistical analysis would identify the DC
point as one that does not fit the model....
The question of whether the DC data point should be given
the same weight as other data points is not an academic quib-
ble. A fundamental step in producing a sound econometric
analysis is to look for aberrant data that is [sic] either errone-
ous, highly variant, or does not fit the specified model. Any
number of diagnostics would have identified the DC data point
as an outlier that should either have been excluded from Dr.
Leftwich's regressions or given less weight than other data. This
is not an issue over which reasonable economists would differ.
... Dr. Leftwich's failure is not a subtle statistical mistake.
This kind of failure to examine the impact of such an outlier
would not be acceptable in an undergraduate econometrics
class, let alone professional work.331
At first blush, it is not clear whether the failure to attend to ob-
vious outliers should be seen as a methodological flaw subject to
heightened scrutiny or a case-specific defect in the implementation
of a valid methodology to be screened only under the Federal Rule
403 standard.332 It might seem that because the impact of the failure
3
-o Because the least-squares regression line is the line that minimizes the sum of the
squared vertical deviations from the line to the data points, a single point that is far
out of line can be very influential. For discussions of outliers, see Kaye & Freedman,
supra note 15, at 137-38; Rubinfeld, supra note 19, at 199.
331 McFadden's Brief, supra note 294, at 15-19.
3 Of course, the exercise in classification is unnecessary under Kumho. Branding an
analysis as "not acceptable in an undergraduate econometrics class, let alone
professional work" is a kiss of death under Kumho's "same level of intellectual rigor"
test. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152.
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to use standard regression diagnostics is a recurring issue that is
likely to be opaque to ,most jurors, it should fall into the former
category. Denominating a test for outliers as a "fundamental step
in producing a sound econometric analysis" tugs in this direction,
but the impact of an outlier on a regression line depends on the
particular data set, and there is no simple corrective procedure 33
While it would be reasonable to place the burden of testing for out-
liers on the analyst, in some situations it may be valid to rely on
least-squares regression results even though there is an outlier. The
factors considered in assessing theories, methods, or propositions
that serve as trans-case premises-considerations like error rates,
scrutiny in the scientific literature, general acceptance, and the
like-are not directed to addressing whether an expert's conclusion
as to handling an outlier in a particular regression is correct. More-
over, it should be feasible to convey to a jury the fact that a result
vanishes when a single point is dropped and to convince them that
reliance on so unstable a regression is foolhardy. As a result, the
better approach might be to classify the treatment of an outlier as a
case-specific matter.
Of course, this classification does not require the admission of
results that are unstable. If the unreliability of a particular analysis
is "not an issue over which reasonable economists would differ,"'
the probative value of the regression will be minimal and the testi-
mony will not be worth the time and effort that would be required
to educate the jury as to its limitations. From a doctrinal stand-
point, however, there is no need to develop and apply special
standards, and the danger of excluding a particular statistical study
as lacking sufficient "intellectual rigor," even though it is within the
range of reasonable debate by experts, counsels against too strin-
gent a level of screening under the gloss placed on Daubert in
Joiner and Kumho 35
CONCLUSION
The recent efforts of the Supreme Court to develop special stan-
dards for the admissibility of scientific expert testimony have given
3 3 Rubinfeld, supra note 19, at 199.
',' McFadden's Brief, supra note 294, at 18.
See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
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new urgency to the search for solutions to longstanding problems
or puzzles created by such screening. The broad contours of the
Daubert trilogy are appealing, but the internal structure needs fur-
ther bracing. Maintaining analytical clarity in this area of the law is
challenging, and statistical and econometric evidence can serve as a
crucible for testing theories of how courts should screen scientific
evidence. Given the obstacles to lay comprehension of complex
statistical analyses, statistical and econometric studies surely qual-
ify for heightened scrutiny under Frye or Daubert. Thus, the recent
trend toward careful screening of such evidence prior to trial is en-
couraging, but not all aspects of studies based on data of interest
only to litigants should be strained through these filters. Phrases
like "gatekeeping" and "intellectual rigor" are well and good, but
heightened scrutiny should be reserved for methodology. Imper-
fections in the execution of a particular study should not result in
exclusion unless they reduce the probative value to the point where
it is substantially outweighed by the dangers of prejudice, confu-
sion, and time-consumption.
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APPENDIX
Table Al
Conwood's Market Shares by State in 1990 and 1997
(Source: Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 327.26)
Percent of Market
1990 1997
Maine 24.2 27.2 3
Michigan 24 32.1 8
New Hampshire 21.5 26.9 5.5
Oregon 18.9 24.3 5.4
Illinois 18 20.4 2.5
Massachusetts 17.6 24.7 7.1
Kentucky 17.6 19.9 2.4
Wisconsin 17.2 27.7 10.5
South Carolina 17.1 23 5.9
Washington 16.7 21.3 4.5
Indiana 16 21.1 5.1
Minnesota 15.4 28.1 12.6
Ohio 15.3 19.2 3.8
Missouri 15 14.1 -0.9
Delaware 14.8 18.8 4
Vermont 14 18 4
Virginia 12.4 14.5 2.4
New Jersey 12.3 18.9 6.6
New York 12.2 17 4.8
North Carolina 11.9 15.9 3.9
Maryland 10.4 14.8 4.4
Louisiana 10.3 8.7 -1.6
Georgia 10.3 12.4 2.1
Tennessee 9.9 10.4 0.5
Iowa 9.9 12.4 2.5
Connecticut 9.8 16.9 7.1






Nebraska 8.5 8 -0.5
Alabama 7.7 8.1 0.4
California 7.7 9.3 1.6
Arkansas 7.6 8.2 0.6
Mississippi 7.4 8.1 0.7
District of Columbia 7.2 17.6 10.3
Colorado 7 7.9 0.9
Florida 6.3 7.7 1.4
South Dakota 5.8 7 1.2
North Dakota 5.8 10.2 4.4
Pennsylvania 5.3 7.5 2.1
Idaho 5.3 8.6 3.4
Arizona 5.2 6.3 1
Montana 5.1 5.4 6.3
West Virginia 5 5.1 0.1
Oklahoma 4.9 5.1 0.3
Utah 4.6 5.3 0.7
Nevada 4.5 5.7 1.2
Texas 4.5 4.8 0.3
New Mexico 3 3 0
Wyoming 2.4 2 -0.3
Rhode Island 1.4 15.2 13.7
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Table A2
Conwood's 1990 and 1997 Adjusted Market Shares by State




Maine 24.2 30.3 6.1
Michigan 24 36.2 12.1
New Hampshire 21.5 26.9 5.5
Oregon 18.9 25.7 6.8
Illinois 18 22.6 4.7
Massachusetts 17.6 32.6 15
Kentucky 17.6 20.4 2.9
Wisconsin 17.2 33 15.8
South Carolina 17.1 23.5 6.4
Washington 16.7 24.2 7.4
Indiana 16 23.8 7.8
Minnesota 15.4 32.1 16.6
Ohio 15.3 20.4 5
Missouri 15 15.2 0.2
Delaware 14.8 18.8 4
Vermont 14 25 11
Virginia 12.4 16.2 3.8
New Jersey 12.3 18.9 6.6
New York 12.2 20.5 8.3
North Carolina 11.9 16.4 4.4
Maryland 10.4 15.4 5
Louisiana 10.3 10.7 0.4
Georgia 10.3 13.6 3.3
Tennessee 9.9 10.5 0.6
Iowa 9.9 12.4 2.5
Connecticut 9.8 24.3 14.5
Kansas 9.7 11.3 1.6
Nebraska 8.5 9.8 1.3
Alabama 7.7 8.6 0.9






Arkansas 7.6 9.5 1.9
Mississippi 7.4 8.1 0.7
District of Columbia 7.2 17.6 10.3
Colorado 7 9.3 2.3
Florida 6.3 8.6 2.2
South Dakota 5.8 7 1.2
North Dakota 5.8 12 6.2
Pennsylvania 5.3 9.9 4.5
Idaho 5.3 9.6 4.4
Arizona 5.2 8 2.7
Montana 5.1 10.2 5.1
West Virginia 5 5.5 0.5
Oklahoma 4.9 8.2 3.4
Utah 4.6 8.7 4.1
Nevada 4.5 5.7 1.2
Texas 4.5 6.2 1.7
New Mexico 3 5.5 2.6
Wyoming 2.4 2 -0.3
Rhode Island 1.4 15.2 13.7
[Vol. 87:19332018
